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INTRODUCTION

The Purposes of the Study

With increasing intensity and wider application the concept of
cost/benefit analysis has been invoked in recent years as a relevant
and necessary consideration in governmental decision making. This
perhaps has been nowhere more evident than with regard to the
activities of federal administrative agencies.
As the demand has increased for assuring that administrative
agencies give due weight to the costs as well as the benefits which
attend their decisions, advocates of cost/benefit analysis have recognized that there are sometimes obstacles to implementing the
concept. On occasion this may have been attributable to agency
intransigence. Unswerving devotion to perceived notions of the
mission of an agency may be reflected in reluctance to engage in a
studious balancing of costs and benefits.
Even when administrative officials concede or even embrace the
desirability of cost/benefit analysis, there may be statutory barriers
to the application of the principles. The nature of the congressional mandate under which an agency operates may be such that
there is no opportunity or discretion for the invocation of principles of cost/benefit analysis without simultaneous conflict with leg-

1985

Administrative Cost/Benefit Analysis

islative intent.
The purpose of this study was to identify instances under federal
law in which statutes constitute barriers to the application of the
principles of cost/benefit analysis in administrative decision making, to examine some selected statutory barriers and to assess the
need for and desirability of their retention or change. A further
purpose was to consider the relationship between such statutory
barriers and certain broader themes of administrative law. The ultimate objective was to provide a basis for reflection on the matter
of whether or not statutory barriers are useful and desirable.
The stated purposes of the study at first glance seemed rather
straightforward, and the study itself generally a matter of research
and execution, albeit extensive. This apparent ease and simplicity
proved deceptive as a consequence of several factors.
It is commonplace in the folklore of regulatory reform that cost/
benefit analysis is synonymous with enlightened decision making.
The thought is that better decisions will result if only sufficient
effort is made to identify all pertinent costs and benefits of proposed governmental action and then to weigh them, each against
the other. A suspicion which appears to underlie some of the ardent advocacy of cost/benefit analysis is that too often the desirability of administrative action has been measured only against perceived notions of public benefit with scant attention given to costs,
public and private.
One difficulty this presented for purposes of the study was in
discerning what the advocates of cost/benefit analysis really mean
when they invoke the principle. Certainly there is no clear evidence of unanimity. At one level it may entail an intricately sophisticated process of factual inquiry and prediction concerning
the probable consequences of proposed administrative action and
the weighing of those consequences to determine the best course of
action. At another level cost/benefit analysis may be little more
than a rallying cry for less, or at least delayed administrative action. In this latter sense cost/benefit analysis carries with it the
answer to the public policy questions to which it is directed-if
only government would think about costs as well as benefits, as it
had not in the past, it would regulate less intrusively or not at all.
Notwithstanding the reality that cost/benefit analysis may mean
radically different things to different people for different purposes,
it was essential for the study that some definition be adopted
against which statutes could be measured to determine whether
they did or did not present barriers to cost/benefit analysis. The
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section which follows discusses the definition adopted for purposes
of the study. Naturally a determination of the presence of a statutory barrier is a function of the definition employed.
The study was complicated as well by expectations. The expectations were that statutory barriers exist in significant numbers and
certainly represent more than occasional and random aberrations.
In the face of increasing advocacy of wider and more intense application of principles of cost/benefit analysis in administrative decision making, it seems that the movement encountered not unexpected opposition. And it appears that one manifestation of that
opposition was the refrain that Congress often has precluded cost/
benefit analysis in the basic statutes governing the actions of particular agencies. Apparently this was heard with sufficient frequency to raise interest in the extent and nature of such barriers.1
The question was: did they exist on any widespread basis with the
consequence of impeding application of principles of cost/benefit
analysis? When the study failed to unearth statutory barriers in
significant numbers, an inevitable process of reexamination and rethinking was the result. The fact is that what was expected, or at
least suspected, was not found.
B.

The Concept of Cost/Benefit Analysis

The search for a working definition of cost/benefit analysis for
purposes of the study was aided by the high levels of interest in
recent years at the highest levels of government in bringing about
wide application of the principle in governmental decision making.
In the process there emerged a general and prevailing definition
which provided the benchmark against which statutes were measured to assess their status as statutory barriers.
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12291.2 Its general purpose was "to reduce the burdens of existing
1. Although the study was conducted at the request of and sponsored by the Office of
the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, the views expressed
are solely those of the author. Special thanks are due Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Esq., Research
Director of the Administrative Conference, for his insights in reviewing drafts of the study
and to Scott R. Devenney and Mark L. Dopp, research assistants while students at the
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law.
2. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). The Order is the most recent Presidential effort to require
administrative decision making to take into account the broader economic consequences of
proposed action. Under Executive Order 11821 President Ford required inflationary impact
statements in connection with proposed rules. 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975 Comp.). In Executive
Order 12044 President Carter required economic impact analysis in the context of alternative courses of action. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979). The latter was repealed by Executive Order
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and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory
process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and insure well-reasoned regulations . . . ."- Although the focus of the
order was upon the rulemaking activities of federal administrative
agencies,4 its provisions concerning cost/benefit analysis in
rulemaking provide a general definition of the current meaning of
the concept for purposes of all administrative actions and this
study.
Some basic precepts of the order are that:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the need for and consequences of proposed government action;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits
to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to
society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen;
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the
aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the conditions of the
particular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the national
economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the future.'

These principles are developed further in the order's more explicit
requirements for regulatory impact analysis and review for proposed major rules. These provide that in both the preliminary and
final stages of rulemaking the following information must be
presented:
(1) A description of the potential benefits of the rule, including any beneficial effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification of those likely to benefit;
(2) A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any adverse
effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and the identification
of those likely to bear the costs;
(3) A determination of the potential net benefits of the rule, including an
evaluation of effects that cannot be quantified in monetary terms. .... I

Under this approach cost/benefit analysis is an extraordinarily
expansive concept. Neither costs nor benefits are confined to quantifiable economics. There is room for taking measure of more sub12291.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
Id. § 1(a)(1) of the order excludes, for example, agency adjudication.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
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jective and intangible costs and benefits. This holds out the prospect of reducing the burdens of applying the concept in, for
example, social welfare contexts. This approach also suggests that
the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis is to be much
more than casual. It is to be a thorough and searching effort to
identify all pertinent costs and benefits and to measure them to
the extent feasible. The objective is to assure that in selecting
among alternative courses of governmental action an agency identifies and adopts that which produces the maximum net benefit to
society.
The order does take into account the possibility that an agency
may be limited in its ability to engage in and implement cost/benefit analysis. Consequently, its requirements are applicable only "to
the extent permitted by law . . . . 7 Other requirements for regulatory impact analysis and review also recognize the possibility of
barriers to cost/benefit analysis. Thus, the order provides for inclusion of:
(4) A description of the alternative approaches that could substantially
achieve the same regulatory goal at lower cost, together with an analysis of
this potential benefit and costs and a brief explanation of the legal reasons
why such alternatives, if proposed, could not be adopted; and
(5) Unless covered by the description required under paragraph (4) ..
an
explanation of any legal reasons why the rule cannot be based on the requirements set forth in Section 2 [the general requirements] of this Order.8
,

There is considerable similarity between the analysis which an
agency would employ in complying with these particular requirements and the approach taken in this study. In both instances the
common objective is a determination of when, in whole or in part,
a statute bars application of principles of cost/benefit analysis of
the wide-ranging variety specified under the order.
The principles reflected in Executive Order 12291 are grounded
in the common sense of human behavior, history and modern economic theory. First, in its broadest sense, the concept of cost/benefit analysis is common in every day behavior. Weighing whether
one will receive as much, or more, in exchange for what one relinquishes is one form of rational behavior which is hardly of recent
origin, although anyone who has ever come away from a transaction with the sensation of having obtained the worst of the bargain
will readily concede that the ideal of rational behavior is one for
7.
8.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
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which one strives without readily and necessarily achieving it.
Notwithstanding the limitations inherent in this ideal, economics is founded upon a theory of rationality, and at the heart of that
rationality is the idea that an individual does not give up a good
without an expectation of receiving something of equal or greater
value in return, either immediately or in the future. This concept,
involving the weighing of costs against benefits with the objective
of maximizing benefits, was one of the underpinnings in the development of early economic theory. For example, Jeremy Bentham,
in referring to man's desire to avoid pain and achieve pleasure,
wrote that these "masters govern us in all we do, in all we say, and
all we think." Whether one accepts this philosophy of the classical
liberal, the concepts of pain and pleasure, cost and benefit, pervade economic thought.
As to history, some point to the year 1844 and the publication of
an essay, "On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works," by
a French engineer, Jules Dupuit, as the beginning of modern cost/
benefit analysis. 10 The use of cost/benefit analysis in the public
sector in this country, however, appears to be of relatively recent
origin, although examples can be found in the last century and at
the turn of this century. For instance, the Navigation Improvement Act of 1824" and the Reclamation Act of 190212 allowed a
primitive form of cost/benefit analysis in providing that economic
evaluations be drawn from surveys and engineering reports in
making decisions.' 3 Yet it does not appear that these techniques
were employed extensively until as recently as the 1930's when
measurement of benefits, and the desire that these benefits should
outweigh costs, became more prevalent. The Corps of Engineers
began issuing directives to district offices emphasizing the use of
cost/benefit analysis in water projects. The 1939 Reclamation
Act,' 4 for example, required the use of cost/benefit analysis to determine whether irrigation and improvement projects should be
authorized.' Others have found the first modern application in the
9.

E.

IDEOLOGIES

HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS: THE EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND

45 (2d ed. 1975).

10. P. SASSONE & W. SCHAFFER, COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS 3-4 (1978). Dupuit suggested a
means for assessing the net social benefit of a public works project, a concept which is integral to cost/benefit analysis principles.
11. Act of May 24, 1824, ch. 139, 4 Stat. 32, 32-33.
12. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388.
13. R. McKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SysTEMs ANALYSIS 18 (1958).
14. Reclamation Act of 1939, ch. 418, 53 Stat. 1198.
15. McKEAN, supra note 13, at 19.
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Flood Control Act of 19366 which provided that the benefits of
projects "to whomsoever they may accrue" must exceed their
17

costs.

Indeed, one must look to even more recent decades for indications of more direct, widespread and intentional applications of the
modern concept of cost/benefit analysis in governmental decision
making. In the 1960's under then Secretary of Defense McNamara,
the idea of cost/benefit analysis in the formulation of defense policy was implemented with enthusiasm and on a widespread scale.
This represented an effort to employ systematic analysis measuring costs and benefits in the defense planning process. In 1965,
with the inauguration of the Planning-Programing-Budgeting
(PPB) System, the fundamental approach was made formal and
folded into the Defense Department's basic decision-making process."8 PPB involved the methodical and complex assessment of
program objectives, "output," total costs, and alternatives with the
objective of "execut[ing] our choices effectively and efficiently in
order to free scarce resources for other good and useful things."19
At the other end of the governmental spectrum the use of cost/
benefit analysis as a planning tool in social welfare agencies lagged
substantially behind the defense and public works areas. This has
been explained on the ground that projects in the latter areas lend
themselves to more effective advance planning and analysis. Social
programs do not fare as well in this respect on account of greater
deficiencies in knowledge regarding the relationships between what
must go into such programs and what is derived from them.20
The historical record affords ample evidence that the studious
and intentional application of cost benefit analysis in governmental
decision making is neither of recent origin nor a unique invention
of Executive Order 12291.
Finally and similarly, Executive Order 12291 is well founded in
modern economic theory. The Order addresses the matter of the
consequences of administrative action in terms of costs and benefits without limiting these to what can be measured in quantitative
16.
17.
18.

Flood Control Act of 1936, ch. 688, 49 Stat. 1570-96.
SASSONE & SCHAFFER, supra note 10, at 4.
R. HAVERMAN, THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC INVESTMENTS: AN Ex POST
FACTO EVALUATION OF WATER RESOURCES INVESTMENTS 3 (1972). See generally H. HINRICHS
& G. TAYLOR, PROGRAM BUDGETING AND BENEFIT-COsT ANALYSIS 212-336 (1969), for a discussion of various cost/benefit techniques employed by a variety of federal agencies in the evaluation of programs during the 1960's.
19. HAVERMAN, supra note 18, at 4-5.
20. Id. at 1-3, 23-32.

1985

Administrative Cost/Benefit Analysis

terms alone; consequently it is illustrative of what is one formulation of the basic principle of cost/benefit analysis. It must be
noted, however, that there are alternative formulations which generally deal with the same fundamental issues. In some degree the
distinctions between cost/benefit analysis and these other formulations may be little more than semantic, but in some the distinctions are intended to reflect often subtle shifts in emphasis, and in
others the differences may be intended to provide basic substantive limitations on the nature of an agency's inquiry.
This phenomenon of gradation and variation in concepts is an
apparently intractable part of the cost/benefit analysis landscape.
As one observer has noted:
One of the more confusing aspects of incorporating cost analysis into evaluation and decision making is that a number of different, but related, concepts and terms are often used interchangeably in referring to such approaches. Among these are cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit, cost-utility, and
cost-feasibility. Although each is related to and can be considered to be a
member in good standing of the cost-analysis family, each is characterized
by important differences that make it appropriate to specific applications
21

A sampling of some of the variations on the theme illustrates that
there really is no necessarily common and accepted definition of
the concept, at least as reflected in common usage.
Typically cost/benefit analysis represents the technique for
"evaluation of alternatives according to a comparison of both...
costs and benefits when each is measured in monetary terms."2 2
This analytical approach might be employed to measure the availability of a single alternative in light of a requirement that it can
be adopted only if there is a net benefit-to-cost, or it might be employed to select from among competing alternatives with the object
23
of singling out that with the highest benefit to cost ratio.
Cost-effectiveness analysis, in contrast, "refers to the evaluation
of alternatives according to both their costs and their effects with
regard to producing some outcome or set of outcomes."' 2 This
method does not require that benefits be reduced to monetary
terms. Under it one assesses the relative cost of achieving a common objective by various means for the purpose of selecting that
which provides "the maximum effectiveness per level of cost or
21.
22.
23.
24.

H.

LEVIN, COST-EFFECTIVENEss: A PRIMER 17

(1983).

Id. at 21.

See generally COST-BENEFIT
LEVIN, supra note 21, at 21.

ANALYSIS 9-65 (B. McCormick ed. 1972).
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which require[s] the least cost per level of effectiveness. 2 5
And another, cost-utility analysis, affords yet another method
which is even further removed from the necessity for quantitative
information. Under it costs are measured against "the estimated
value or utility of their outcomes."2 6 Cost-feasibility analysis introduces another dimension in which one examines alternatives
only in terms of their costs to ascertain whether they are possible
27
in light of available budgetary resources.
These various approaches have much in common, in objective
and approach, with the principal differences in the method and
level of specificity of measuring benefit, effectiveness and utility.
The shared desire is the selection of the alternative with "the lowest cost for any particular result or the best result for any particular cost."' 28 Yet it is apparent that the economists employ much
more precise and refined categorizations than those in the non-professional and governmental arenas. Indeed, there are even subtler
gradations. For example, Lester B. Lave has prepared an analysis
of the various frameworks for regulation which provides, in varying
degree, an opportunity for the weighing of benefits against risks.2 9
Consequently, a statute might provide for comparison of direct
risks against direct risks with the focus upon adverse and beneficial effects: for example, of a particular food upon health. In this
context one risk might be mitigated while another is created; the
respective risks would be weighed. An expansion upon this concept
might allow inclusion of indirect risks in the analysis.3 0 In this context not only persons consuming a food in question would be taken
into account, but also those producing and distributing the food.
Nevertheless, in either case one would not be entitled to take into
account effects unrelated to the health of affected persons. In another formulation, risk-benefit, Lave notes that one would be entitled to take into account general benefits as well as general risks of
nonhealth as well as health consequences. 1
It is apparent that Executive Order 12291 draws extensively on
this economic literature. It is equally apparent that it does not fall
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. See also COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (T. Goldman ed. 1967); E. MISHAN,
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1976); E. MISHAN, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1981).
29. See generally L. LAVE, QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION 8-28 (1982).
30. Id. at 15-18.
31. Id. at 17-19.
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neatly within the traditional quantitative approach to cost/benefit
analysis. In allowing identification of those costs and benefits
which do not reduce to monetary terms, it allows a higher degree
of subjectivity in weighing alternatives. It is unlikely the economists would view the approach in Executive Order 12291 as true
cost/benefit analysis. Nonetheless, the Executive Order was selected for purposes of the study in light of its recent origins, widespread recognition in governmental circles and ties to the common
sense, historic and economic underpinnings of cost/benefit analysis. It seemed to present as good a working definition as any available for identifying statutes which preclude cost/benefit analysis.
C.

The Scope and Methodology of the Study

With only a few exceptions, the study was rather comprehensive.
The objective was to identify statutory barriers to cost/benefit
analysis wherever they might be found in federal law. Consequently, the definitions of agency and administrative decision
making applied in the search for statutory barriers also were
comprehensive.
For purposes of the study the definition of administrative agency
was not confined to traditional conceptions of agencies primarily
regulatory in nature. Had that approach been adopted, the focus
might have been limited to agencies whose activities concern the
imposition of "government standards and significant economic responsibilities on individuals or organizations outside the federal establishment."3' Rather the study looked to broader definitions
such as those provided in the Administrative Procedure Act 3
(APA) and Executive Order 12291. The former provides that
"agency means each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency . . .;"- the latter provides that "'agency' means any authority of the United States that is an 'agency' under 44 U.S.C. §
3502(1). . .. ,,-1
The effect was to include most arms of the federal
32.

DOMESTIC COUNCIL REFORM GROUP ON REGULATORY REFORM, THE CHALLENGE OF

1977).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76 (1982).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982).
35. Exec. Order No. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128, § 1(d) (1982). Section 3502(1) of Title 44
defines "agency" as "any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of
the government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency .... " 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (1982).
REGULATORY REFORM-A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 47 (Jan.
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establishment which would customarily be recognized as and considered government agencies.
However, the exceptions to these definitions were taken into account. Thus, Congress, the judiciary, territorial governments and
other governmental entities and activities excluded under the APA
definition were not considered." Generally, agencies excluded from
37
the reach of Executive Order 12291 were treated similarly.
One important consequence of this approach was the inclusion
of governmental activities pertaining to eligibility for federal
grants, assistance and contracts. Matters of this nature might be
considered by some officials as suitable candidates for application
of principles of cost/benefit analysis, and statutory barriers might
inhibit their ability to do so.
Furthermore, no effort was made to limit the kinds of agency
decision making for purposes of the study. Thus, "minor" as well
as "major" rulemaking authority was considered relevant." Actually, any form of agency action was considered within its scope,3 9
and as a result statutory barriers were sought in all facets of administrative decisional authority, including the traditional categories of formal and informal rulemaking, formal and informal adjudication, and all other forms of a less traditionally determinate
nature.
In light of the objective of determining the existence and nature
of statutory barriers to the application of principles of cost/benefit
analysis by federal agencies, the initial step in the study was to
examine most titles of the United States Code in their entirety.
Some titles, however, were not examined on the basis of a determination of improbable relevance. Thus, Titles 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedure), 26 (Internal Revenue Code), 28 (Judiciary and Ju36. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1982), which excludes various governmental activities from
the definition of agency, including "(A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; [and] (D) the
government of the District of Columbia." Id.
37. See 4 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (1982), which excludes from the definition of agency "the
Federal Election Commission, the government of the District of Columbia and of the territories and possessions of the United States and their various subdivisions, or government
owned contractor operated facilities including laboratories engaged in national defense research and production activities ....
" Id.
38. Executive Order 12291 draws a distinction between major and minor rules. The
former, for example, are those with probable annual effect on the economy of $100 million
or more.
39. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982), which defines "agency action" to include "the whole
or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial

thereof, or failure to act ....

" Id.
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dicial Procedure), and 48 (Territories and Insular Possessions)
were excluded at the outset. Following review of the code the potential statutory barriers identified were categorized to the extent
possible. These results and findings are presented in Part II. Several selected statutes were analyzed in greater detail and are
presented in the case studies in Part III.40
In assessing the existence and nature of a statutory barrier the
working definition provided by Executive Order 12291 was measured against the statutes examined. The question asked in each
instance was whether the terms of the statute would preclude carrying out the directives of the Order. It was taken into account
that a statutory barrier to application of the principles of cost/benefit analysis need not be total. A barrier might be partial in that,
for example, it precludes consideration of nonhealth benefits. The
attempt was made in this study to identify barriers of this nature
as well; any inhibition of an agency's ability to employ the wideranging balancing of pluses and minuses of Executive Order 12291
would, in some measure, constitute a statutory barrier. The effect
was that, for purposes of this study, the concept of cost/benefit
analysis was treated expansively.
This approach was consistent with the economists' perceptions
of legal constraints on the application of cost/benefit analysis principles. For example, Sassone and Schaffer have identified a variety
of constraints in cost/benefit analysis, including budgetary, social,
political, institutional and legal. As to the latter they use the example of pollution which would result from a project which cannot be
considered in terms of costs and benefits because some legal standard places a standard or limit on the permissible amount of pollution."1 This constrains the analysis because some alternatives
which the analyst might otherwise consider are precluded by the
legal constraint and leave the analyst to address only those which
40. One caveat concerning the methodology is in order. The methodology employed
required the reviewers of the Code to go beyond the immediate areas of personal expertise.
This was to be expected because of the comprehensive nature of the study, and the phenomenon was even more pronounced because the principal reviewers were second and third year
law students. Consequently, there may be statutory provisions which deserve to be included
as examples of statutory barriers which are not. This is not meant as a criticism; rather it is
to explain why readers might wonder why particular statutes which they consider barriers to
cost/benefit analysis have not been included in the study. Although it may be that a statute
was considered and consciously excluded, it may also be that an inexperienced reviewer,
unfamiliar with the applicable substantive law, passed over it. There was really no way of
avoiding this, absent a team of experienced experts reviewing statutes within their respective areas of competence. This was beyond the reach of the methods employed in this study.
41. SASSONE & SCHAFFER, supra note 10, at 160.
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are within the legal limits. 42
II.

ILLUSTRATIVE VARIETIES OF STATUTORY INHIBITIONS TO THE
APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The following section of this article presents the results of the
basic survey of the United States Code, with the exception of certain titles as noted above.
A.

A PreliminaryNote-The Absence of Statutory Barriers in
a Significant Number of U.S. Code Titles

Any expectation of widespread existence of statutory barriers to
the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis is diminished
to a degree by the fact that numerous titles of the United States
Code revealed no such barriers. None was identified in Titles 1
(General Provisions), 2 (The Congress), 3 (The President), 4 (Flag
and Seal, Seat of Government and the States), 5 (Government Organization and Employees), 6 (Official and Penal Bonds), 9 (Arbitration), 11 (Bankruptcy), 13 (Census), 14 (Coast Guard), 17
(Copyrights), 20 (Education), 24 (Hospitals, Asylums and Cemeteries), 27 (Intoxicating Liquors), 32 (National Guard), 35 (Patents), 37 (Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services), 41
(Public Contracts), and 44 (Public Printing and Documents).
The absence of statutory barriers in this number of titles of the
Code has independent significance; the scope of the statutory barrier "problem" does not appear to be quite as extensive as some
might have expected.
B.

Illustrative Varieties

Most statutory barriers to the application of principles of cost/
benefit analysis were found in areas in which the government regulates or controls the conduct of private business enterprise. This
was not unexpected in light of the pervasiveness of government
regulation of business, notwithstanding recent initiatives toward
deregulation. They arise in various forms and are ostensibly justified on the basis of varying rationales ranging from economic regulation to protection of the public health, safety and welfare. What
these statutory barriers represent are instances where Congress has
made rather precise judgments concerning the controls to be imposed and limited the discretion of federal agencies to relax or al42.

Id.

1985

Administrative Cost/Benefit Analysis

503

ter them. The effect is to preclude the application of principles of
cost/benefit analysis. It is clear that the economist would view such
limitations as legal constraints on the ability of the analyst to employ cost/benefit analysis within the zone of preclusion. In contrast, the lawyer is likely to consider this simply a customary and
even necessary constraint on administrative discretion, inherent in
any statute which delegates decision-making power to an agency
with any measure of specificity. As will be seen, this divergence
presents special, problems in determining what should be considered a true statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis.
Many of these barriers take the form of mandatory statutory
standards. Thus, under the Cotton Standards Act"3 most transactions in cotton must be in the terms of the official cotton standards' names and descriptions used in the Act. Generally, it is unlawful for either private parties or the Secretary of Agriculture to
evade the statutory standards for cotton.4 4 Similarly, there are
statutory standards for gauges for sheet and plate iron steel,4 5 electrical and photometric measurement, 46 barrels for apples 47 and
barrels for limes. 8 Standards of this variety are intended primarily,
to achieve objectives of uniformity. In this sense they represent
congressional rejection of flexibility, but to the extent that agencies
are deprived of opportunities for cost/benefit analysis in such matters, the congressional determination is not likely to prove
controversial.
Other mandatory statutory standards involve more fundamental
policy choices, including matters of public health and safety. For
example, there are standards for occupant restraint systems in automobiles, 49 regrooved tires, 50 and fuel economy in passenger
cars, 51 which constrict administrative discretion to engage in cost/
benefit analysis. Others include mandatory performance standards
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,5 2
43. 7 U.S.C. §§ 51-65 (1982).
44. Id. § 52.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
46. Id. § 223.
47. Id. § 231.
48. Id. § 237.
49. Id. §§ 1410, 1412. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983), in which the Supreme Court found that the Secretary of Transportation acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rescinding a standard concerning passive restraints in automobiles.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982).
51. Id. § 2002.
52. 30 U.S.C. § 1265 (1982).
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mandatory requirements for adaptive equipment for automobiles
for disabled veterans, 3 standards for safety equipment on railroad
engines and cars,54 standards for goods of its own manufacture
which a railroad may transport, 5 and standards for transport of
hazardous materials on passenger aircraft.56
Mandatory statutory standards concerning employee health and
safety under the Occupational Safety and Health Act 57 and carriage of explosives on vessels have been selected for more extensive
analysis in this study. They are considered in Part III below.5 8
Statutory prescriptions which restrict the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis often apply to product composition
and labeling. Thus, there are instances where Congress has provided for mandatory nutritional enrichment of certain grain flours
within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, 59 and
mandatory fuel economy labels for automobiles." Various provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prescribe
mandatory product labeling, including matters such as saccharin
labeling,"1 margarine labeling, 2 drug labeling,6 3 and flavor, color,
and preservative labeling. 4 As a general matter the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs has no authority to alleviate these
requirements.
Perhaps the most celebrated example of a statutory barrier to
the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis is the Delaney
Clause in the food and drug law which precludes the use of food
additives which induce cancer in humans or animals.6 5 This barrier
is discussed in detail in Part III.
A variety of limitations on cost/benefit analysis have been included in statutory provisions providing for mandatory requirements for registration, permits and licenses. These take the form
of either requirements before certain activities may lawfully be
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

38 U.S.C. ch. 39 (1982).
45 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
49 U.S.C. § 10746 (1982).
Id. § 1807(a).
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 655 (1982).
See generally infra Parts III.A & G.
7 U.S.C. § 1431c (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 2006 (1982).
34 3
(o)-(p) (1982).
21 U.S.C. §§
§
347(b)-(c).
Id.
Id. § 352.
Id. § 343(k).
Id. § 409. See also new animal drug provisions in id.
See infra part III.B.

§

360(d).
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conducted or conditions on activities, once registered or licensed.
There are several examples in statutes pertaining to the Department of Agriculture, including provisions for pesticide registration," permits for importation of nursery stock, 8 licensing of commission merchants, dealers, and brokers,6 9 certification of
shipments of apples and pears,7 0 and certification of grapes and
plums for export.7 1 Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act there
are statutory requirements for certification of drugs containing insulin,7 2 establishment registration, 7 and prescription requirements

for dispensation of controlled substances.7 ' These are illustrative of
the variety of statutory barriers of this nature. Indeed, more were
identified in this area than perhaps in any other, 75 although this
should not be taken as a special indicator of congressional behavior. It may simply reflect the widespread application of registration, permits and licenses as techniques of regulatory control.
Another manifestation of the statutory barrier is found in the
area of governmental inspections. Thus, mines must be closed if
certain specified dangers are discovered in the course of inspection, 6 the Coast Guard must inspect the crew's quarters on American vessels with the prescribed frequency,77 and distilled spirits
must first be placed in a public store or bonded warehouse and
cannot be removed until inspected and stamped.7 8 In these instances the breadth of discretion typical of regulatory inspections
67. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(a), (d), (e) (1982).
68. Id. § 154.
69. Id. §§ 499(c), (d).
70. Id. § 581.
71. Id. §§ 591, 594.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 356(b) (1982).
73. Id. § 360(b).
74. Id. § 829.
75. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1242 (1982) (enrollment of actuaries under ERISA); 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (1982) (certain conditions in leases and prospecting permits); 30 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1982) (prospecting permits or exploratory permits for coal deposits); 30, U.S.C. § 241(a)
(1982) (prospecting permits for oil shale leases); 30 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) (prospecting permits
for sodium deposits); 30 U.S.C. § 1266(b) (1982) (lead and zinc stabilization program); 33
U.S.C. § 1311 (1982) (EPA effluent limitations); 33 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982) (EPA thermal discharge permits); 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1982) (limitations on certain mergers of domestic and
international telegraph carriers); 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1982) (limitations on grants of FCC licenses); 47 U.S.C. § 734(d) (1982) (limitations on foreign ownership of communication satellites); 49 U.S.C. § 5(f) (1982) (protection of employees in ICC approval of railroad mergers);
49 U.S.C. § 10705(a)(3) (1982) (limitation on ICC establishment of joint rates of certain
street electric railways).
76. 30 U.S.C. § 727 (1982).
77. 46 U.S.C. § 660 (1982).
78. 19 U.S.C. § 467 (1982).
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is absent.
The statutory barrier is also present in the area of mandatory
paperwork, the reports and records required by statute rather than
administrative order. Thus, there is no administrative choice or
discretion in the records to be kept by poultry packers,79 warehouses storing agricultural products,80 certain labor organizations
and their officers and employees, 8 ' and persons subject to OSHA 2
and ERISA.

3

These are illustrative.8 4 Statutorily mandated re-

ports and records are a common phenomenon.
A number of statutory barriers exist in the area of governmental
control of agriculture. These affect both the production and marketing of agricultural products. They take such forms as acreage
87
allotments, 6 price supports"6 and commodity marketing quotas.
The other principle area in which a significant number of statutory barriers were identified is in the dispensation of governmental
benefits. This includes not only traditional benefits, but also
grants, contracts and loans.
In connection with social welfare benefits one finds a mandatory
definition of household income for purposes of determining eligibility for food stamps.88 Similarly, there are mandatory allocations
and limitations in the determination of various Veterans Administration benefits.8 9
A common mechanism for administrative control is the attachment of terms and conditions to government contracts which do
not necessarily relate to the direct objects of the contract. In nu79. 7 U.S.C. § 221 (1982).
80. Id. § 260.
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-33, 438, 461 (1982).
82. Id. § 657.
83. Id. §§ 1023-24, 1030.
84. See also 30 U.S.C. § 732 (1982) (Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act); id. §
813 (Coal Mine Health and Safety Act); 31 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982) (reports and records of
currency and foreign monetary transactions); 47 U.S.C. § 1434 (1982) (certain firms subject
to FCC jurisdiction); 50 U.S.C. § 126 (1982) (licensees for disposition of explosives or ingredients for explosives).
85. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1374, 1379(c) (1982) (mandatory acreage allotments for wheat and
mandatory monitoring).
86. Id. §§ 1421-22, 1441 (mandatory price support floors).
87. Marketing quotas under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture for cigarfiller tobacco, 7 U.S.C. § 515(h) (1982); sugar, id. §§ 1111-18, 1134 (1982); tobacco, id. §§
1312-13 (1982); corn, id. § 1329 (1982); wheat, id. §§ 1330, 1334, 1340 (1982); cotton, id. §§
1342, 1347 (1982); rice, id. §§ 1352, 1355 (1982).
88. 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982).
89. 38 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 105, 110, 246, 302, 404, 360, 505, 705, 708, 743, 712, 1504,
1511, 1621, 1631, 1661, 1673, 1682, 1685, 1690-93, 1700-14, 1762 (1982).
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merous instances it is Congress and not the agencies which has
made the determination of what those terms and conditions are to
be. The effect is a statutory barrier to agency assessment of
whether the benefit of such terms and conditions is outweighed by
their cost. Thus, there are statutory time limitations on USDA
contracts for supplying and mailing seed packets,"0 limitations on
military contracts for property and services, 91 limitations on conflicts of interest in certain research contracts," preferences for concessionaires under prior contracts with the Secretary of the Interior,9
mandatory elements for certain historic preservation
grants,94 various mandatory provisions in highway construction
contracts,9 5 limits on the amount the Veterans Administration may
pay for care in a state home," and time limitations on the length
of public utility contracts 7 and the completion of railroads on
public lands. 8
Many of these limitations pertain to wages and working conditions for employees of those who contract with the government. In
this vein there are prevailing wage rate and hiring preferences in
certain contracts and grants relating to Indians,9 9 prevailing wage
rate requirements in pollution prevention grants,1 00 in the conversion of leased postal facilities, 10 ' and in various Housing and Urban
Development contracts.10 2 Hours of labor on public works are also
limited, 0 3 and the use of convict labor is prohibited in connection
with Postal Service equipment and supplies.'0 4
A variety of statutory limitations also restrict agency discretion
in the area of government loans. There are limitations on persons
eligible for Department of Agriculture real estate loans, on their
purposes and terms, 0 5 and on persons eligible for operating
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

7 U.S.C. § 416 (1982).
10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2306 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 789 (1982).
16 U.S.C. § 20(d) (1982).
Id. § 560.
23 U.S.C. §§ 113, 114, 127, 131, 136, 154 (1982).
38 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (1982).
40 U.S.C. §§ 327-32 (1982).
43 U.S.C. §§ 942-45 (1982).
25 U.S.C. §§ 450(e), 1612(b)(1) (1982).
33 U.S.C. § 1372 (1982).
39 U.S.C. § 410(d) (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 3310 (1982).
40 U.S.C. §§ 327-32 (1982).
39 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1922-25 (1982).
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loans 0 6 as well as emergency loans. 10 7 Similarly, loans under the
Export-Import Act,108 to countries found to violate human
rights, 0 9 for education"1 0 and homes by the Veterans Administration, 1 and for urban renewal" 2 are subject to statutory limitations on agency discretion.
Many of the statutory barriers just discussed have obvious impact on individual persons, but there are some of an even more
direct and personal nature. There are those which affect government employees within the armed services in the form of
mandatory retirement ages for certain members of the military." 3
Outside the military one statute precludes appointment to certain
Veterans Administration medical positions unless the person is
proficient in English.11 4 In the case of immigration controls there
are statutory limitations on the number of immigrant visas which
15
may be issued.
The survey also revealed a number of statutory barriers which
do not lend to broad categorization or generalization. One finds, for
example, various limitations on the powers of the Department of
Agriculture, including provisions for mandatory retention of officially inspected grain samples,1 16 and limitations on the use of cooperative extension funds. 1 7 There are limits on the outstanding
bonds and notes of the Commodity Credit Corporation, 8 on when
professional football games may be televised, 1 9 on the number of
governing bodies the United States Olympic Committee is allowed
to recognize per sport,12 0 and on postal rates for certain articles
which may not vary with distance. 21 Others are mandatory discriminating duties on goods imported in non-United States
ships, "2' 2 mandatory presumptions under the Black Lung Benefits
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. §§ 1941-43.
Id. § 1961.
12 U.S.C. § 635 (1982).
22 U.S.C. § 262(f) (1982).
38 U.S.C. §§ 1686, 1998 (1982).
Id. § 1801; 42 U.S.C. § 1477 (1982).
Id. §§ 1451, 1455, 1459 (1982).
10 U.S.C. §§ 1164, 3883, 3885-86 (1982).
38 U.S.C. § 4105(c) (1982).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-52, 1159 (1982).
7 U.S.C. § 87(a) (1982).
Id. § 345.
15 U.S.C. § 713(a) (1982).
Id. § 1293.
36 U.S.C. § 391 (1982).
39 U.S.C. § 3683 (1982).
19 U.S.C. § 128 (1982).
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Act, 12 3 and limitations on the power of the Secretary of Transportation to approve certain projects.1 24
C.

Some Observations on the Illustrative Varieties

In addition to the relative rarity of statutory barriers to cost/
benefit analysis,"2 5 a candid appraisal of these statutes also indicates that as a group they are generally obscure. This is not to
suggest that on an individual basis they are unimportant. Yet in
the grand sweep of what Congress and its delegatees, the agencies,
are about, the statutory barrier has only a limited and minor role.
Nevertheless, it does appear that on those occasions when Congress does elect to create a statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis, rather than to delegate that authority to an administrative
agency, it is most likely to do so in the context of governmental
control of business activities. Beyond that, it is difficult to discern
any common threads.
The illustrative varieties as a whole also demonstrate the divergence between cost/benefit analysis as perceived by the economist
and the lawyer. The economist is likely to view these limitations on
discretion as constraints and thus barriers. The lawyer, in contrast,
is likely to view many of them as cases of specificity in congressional action, often in areas which one would not consider appropriate candidates for cost/benefit analysis. Yet the economist's
view of the role and potential of this method of decision making is
much more expansive, and he is likely to view the specificity of the
statute as a constraint which reflects a prior, perhaps crude and
perhaps unintended weighing of costs and benefits in the design of
the statute itself. What the statute does is confine the alternatives
which true and full cost/benefit analysis would consider.
III.

CASE STUDIES OF SOME SPECIFIC STATUTORY BARRIERS-THE

NEED FOR RETENTION OR CHANGE

The following portion of this article examines a few of the illustrative varieties in detail. The seven were selected with an eye to
their importance in some instances and in others their representation of different types of statutory barriers designed to achieve different objectives. Most, it will be noted, are drawn from the area of
governmental control of business activities. The seven concern oc123.
124.
125.

30 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1982).
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1982).
See supra part II.A.
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cupational safety and health, food safety, control of toxic substances, mine closure, commodity marketing quotas, prevailing
wage rates in government contracts and grants and transport of
explosive materials.
The purpose of these case studies is to consider the meaning and
impact of each statutory barrier in the context of the desirability
of retention or change. If they in fact serve useful purposes without
unintended or unduly burdensome consequences, there is no need
for change. On the other hand, if the conclusion is to the contrary,
perhaps the barrier merits relaxation or abandonment. The
thought is that the case studies may give some indication of
whether statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis are generally
useful and desirable, and may, in addition, provide insight concerning what constitutes a true statutory barrier.
A.

Occupational Safety and Health

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 placed significant administrative responsibilities on the Secretary of Labor to
pursue the objective of a safe workplace with an attendant reduction in injury and illness on the job. One of the means employed by
Congress in pursuit of this objective was the delegation to the Secretary of the authority "to set mandatory occupational safety and
health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate com"...
"126
merce .
Section 655(b) of the Act provides the Secretary discretionary
authority to adopt such standards by rule when he "determines
that a rule should be promulgated in order to serve the objectives" 2 of the Act. The Secretary's task in developing certain occupational and health standards is complicated, however, by the
provision that:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life.
Development of standards under this subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be
appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health
and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the
126.
127.

29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1982).
Id. § 655(b)(1).
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latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards,
and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of
objective criteria and of the performance desired.""

This special attention given toxic materials and harmful physical
agents in the workplace was motivated in part by recognition of
their increasing use in the workplace. It was estimated that every
twenty minutes a new and potentially toxic chemical was

introduced. 129
As a statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis this section is an
anomaly. As indicated in the Senate Report,
[tihe committee intends that standards promulgated under section 6(b)
shall represent feasible requirements, which, where appropriate, shall be
based on research, experiments, demonstrations, past experience and the
latest available scientific data. Such standards should be directed at assuring, so far as possible, that no employee will suffer impaired health or functional capacity, or diminished life expectancy, by reason of exposure to
hazards involved, even though such exposure may be over the period of his
130
entire working life.

This suggests the possibility that the highest priority must be
given matters of worker safety. On the other hand, there is language in the statute as well as the Senate Report suggesting that
feasibility provides a countervailing consideration which opens opportunities for cost/benefit analysis.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the meaning
of this statute in recent years. Its decisions provide guidance on
the issue of what is required to create an effective statutory
barrier.
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute 3 1 concerned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) standard limiting occupational exposure to the carcinogen benzene. The issue was whether a showing that the
substance causes cancer at high exposure levels "is a sufficient basis for a standard that places the most stringent limitation on exposure to benzene that is technologically and economically possible. ' 132 The agency position was that the statute required this
result and that it was under no obligation to engage in cost/benefit
128. Id. § 655(b)(5).
129.
130.
131.

S. REP. No. 91-1282, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5778.
Id. at 5183-84.
448 U.S. 607 (1980).

132. Id. at 611.
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analysis. 133 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed. It
concluded that the benefits of the regulation had to bear a reasonable relationship to its costs and that OSHA had failed to demon1 34
strate this.
The judgment was affirmed in the Supreme Court. A plurality
did not directly resolve the cost/benefit analysis issue. It found
that there is a threshold determination which must be and had not
been made. What the Secretary must do first is determine whether
issuance of a standard is necessary and appropriate to deal with
the health question at issue. Only then would it be necessary to
determine whether the statute
requires him to select the most protective standard he can consistent with
economic and technological feasibility, or whether, as respondents argue,
the benefits of the regulation must be commensurate with the costs of its
implementation. Because the Secretary did not make the required threshold
finding in this case, we have no occasion to determine whether costs must
be weighed against benefits in an appropriate case.' 35

The plurality did, however, give some indication of its inclination
to conclude that the respondents' position was consistent with congressional intent. 136 And Justice Powell, concurring in part, was
willing to answer the question which the plurality reserved, rejecting OSHA's claim that once the threshold determination was
7
made, cost/benefit analysis need not be employed.1 3
Justices Blackmun, Brennan and White joined Justice Marshall
in dissent. They found the language of the statute and the intent
of Congress clear and noted that "no cost-benefit analysis is referred to at any point in the statute or its legislative history."1 38
The feasibility standard was only "to prevent the Secretary from
materially harming the financial condition of regulated industries
in order to eliminate risks of impairment," '3 9 although they also
felt it was not necessary to decide this definitively.4 0
The Benzene case, thus, left open the basic issues concerning the
role, if any, for cost/benefit analysis under section 655(b). The Cot133.
134.
135.

American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 502-05.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 640.

136. Id. at 642.
137. Id. at 668-69. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the concurring opinion of
Justice Rehnquist on grounds of impermissible delegation of legislative power.
138. Id. at 719.

139. Id. at 720.
140.

Id. at 720-21.
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ton Dust case' in 1981 resolved the matter.
The Court focused on the "to the extent feasible" language in
the statute and concluded that "cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is
not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is.""' 2 Feasibility analysis requires an assessment and conclusion that the
standard is "capable of being done. '143 Under this interpretation
the statute did constitute a barrier to cost/benefit analysis, but by
virtue of a statutory requirement for a different and lesser kind of
analysis.
These two cases are instructive on the subject of statutory barriers in a number of important respects. At the most fundamental
level they demonstrate that if Congress desires to create a statutory barrier to application of principles of cost/benefit analysis, it
must do so with considerable specificity and above all, clarity. To
the extent that ambiguity in the statutory language and even the
legislative history can be reduced or eliminated, the likelihood of
effectuating the will of Congress will increase.
The alternative is substantial risk of what occurred in the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases. In each there was a supportive agency
which believed it was required to act without cost/benefit analysis,
there was an affected industry which believed the contrary, and
the judiciary was in substantial disagreement and disarray on the
issue of just what Congress intended. Justice Marshall in dissent in
the Benzene case charged the plurality with ignoring "the plain
meaning of the Occupational and Health Act of 1970 in order to
bring the authority of the Secretary of Labor in line with the plurality's own views of proper regulatory policy."''
Obviously there
is basis for disagreement on the legitimacy of this charge, but unquestionably a more precise statute would have materially reduced
the risk of judicial manipulation of the kind alleged.
Arguably, the principal loss attributable to the uncertainty surrounding section 655(b)(1) was time and resources until the Supreme Court resolved the issue in the Cotton Dust case by finding
that consideration of feasibility and cost/benefit analysis were not
synonymous and that Congress did not require the latter. But the
question of what the Court would have done if the agency had interpreted the statute as requiring cost/benefit analysis presents an
intriguing hypothetical. Certainly the probability is greater that
141.
142.
143.
144.

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 688.
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the Court would have supported the agency interpretation, and if
so, this accentuates the point that specificity and clarity are desirable in the design of statutory barriers.
The Cotton Dust case also raises another intriguing aspect of the
issue of the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis.
Mandatory use of cost/benefit analysis must be as expressly required as a barrier to use. The Court indicated that Congress must
require cost/benefit analysis if an agency is to be required to employ it: "When Congress has intended that an agency engage in
cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the
face of the statute. . . .Congress uses specific language when intending that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis. 1 ' 45 This
void may be filled by other than congressional action. This is what
Executive Order 12291 accomplished with respect to major rules,
although the legality of this approach has been questioned. 1"
The implication is that if Congress does not require cost/benefit
analysis, an agency is not inclined to employ it and the action does
not pertain to a major rule subject to the Executive Order, the
agency will not be forced to do so. If this is important to Congress,
it should anticipate this and deal with the matter by express statutory requirement.
From the cases one discerns that the true statutory barrier to
cost/benefit analysis, in contrast to the economist's perception, requires more than mere specificity of delegation. Although specificity may restrict the scope of cost/benefit analysis in precluding
consideration of some otherwise available alternatives, there would
appear to be a remaining range of alternatives for further and full
application of the principles if an agency is so inclined. Thus specificity of delegation alone presents only a partial barrier. A full and
true barrier would seem to require a clear expression of legislative
intent, preferably on the face of the statute and at a minimum in
its legislative history, before the courts will find that cost/benefit
analysis is precluded.
B. Food Safety
Perhaps the most celebrated example of the statutory barrier to
the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis is found in the
145. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 510.
146. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: PresidentialControl
of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981).
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 147 The Delaney Clause, as
it is commonly known, is included in three separate provisions of
the Act which concern food additives, animal drugs and color additives. 14 The Clause as it appears in the food additives provision is
representative of the others; it provides with regard to issuance of
food additive regulations that:
No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of the data before the
secretary
(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the
conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe: Provided,
that no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal ....149

The purpose of the clause is clear. It precludes the approval of
food additives shown to induce cancer in humans or animals. Furthermore, the courts have recognized the absolute nature of the
prohibition. This is unlike some other important areas of regulatory policy within the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) control. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
observed in a case involving the animal drug, DES:
Outside the per se rule of the Delaney Clause, the typical issue for the FDA
is not the absolute safety of a drug. Most drugs are unsafe in some degree.
Rather, the issue for the FDA is whether to allow sale of the drug, usually
under specific restrictions. Resolution of this issue inevitably means calculating whether the benefits which the drug produces outweigh the costs of
its restricted use. 50

Others have concluded similarly that the strictures of the Delaney Clause are absolute. As Dr. Charles Black noted: "In short, the
policy precludes the rational weighing of cost against benefit in the
contemplation of any particular substance as a food additive.''
An absolutist view of the Delaney Clause merits some refinement. Peter Hutt and Richard Merrill have noted that although
the Clause gives equal weight to animal and human studies and
147. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1982).
148. Id. §§ 348(c)(3)(a), 360b(d)(1)(H), 376(b)(5)(B).

149. Id. § 348(c)(3)(a).
150. Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See also Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1966) (Delaney Clause "is generally
intended to prohibit the use of any additives which under any conditions induce cancer in
any strain of test animal.").
151. Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in the
Formulationof Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1084, 1111 (1984).
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allows no opportunity to take the size of dose into consideration,
certain statutory terms in the Clause are undefined and thus leave
room for scientific judgment. Neither "induce," "cancer," nor
"tests appropriate" are defined. They believe this means that "scientific judgment has played, and apparently was intended to play,
an important role in the policy's application." '5 2 The result under
this analysis is flexibility and discretion in determining whether
the conditions of Delaney are met and none once it is determined
they are. 15 3
Indeed, Peter Hutt has written that much of the controversy
surrounding the Delaney Clause is based on false premises. He suggests that it was never intended to be a statement of scientific
principle, but rather one of public policy, that the public policy
reflected in the Clause is in accord with the public policy of the
food safety laws generally and that the FDA's position on food additives would be the same even without the Clause.154 Hutt concludes that "the Delaney Clause is utterly irrelevant to current
food safety policy . . . ."155 The implication is that other food
safety policies reflected in the Act would require actions comparable to those which the FDA has taken under the Delaney Clause.
The Hutt view is supported by the FDA's own position in its
regulatory actions with respect to the artificial sweetener
saccharin. In proposing to remove saccharin from food usage, the
Commissioner emphasized that his actions were not based exclusively on the Delaney Clause, notwithstanding press reports to the
contrary. He noted that the same result would be required under
the Act's general safety requirements for food additives and that
under these the FDA "is not empowered to take into account the
asserted benefits of any food additive . .1.5. If so, the significance is that the statutory barriers in the food safety law are not
confined to the Delaney Clause.
Nevertheless, the prevailing view and common denominator in
these various positions seems to be that the Delaney Clause does
serve as a statutory barrier to application of principles of cost/benefit analysis. And, whatever its perceived nature in the eyes of
others, congressional behavior suggests that it considers it such. In
R. MERRILL & P. HuTT,FOOD AND DRUG LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 78 (1980).
153. Id.
154. Hutt, Public Policy Issues in Regulating Carcinogens in Food, 33 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 541, 542 (1978).
155. Id. at 542.
156. 42 Fed. Reg. 19996, 19999 (April 15, 1977).

152.
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1977, Congress found it necessary to move to prevent the impending FDA ban on saccharin. It was common knowledge that Congress was motivated in substantial measure by public perceptions
of the benefits and utility of the artificial sweetener. 157 Even
though Congress did not eliminate the statutory barrier, its moratorium and study decision had the effect of deflecting and deferring the impact of the Delaney Clause. 5 8 In this manner, benefits
were taken into account.
Whether the Delaney Clause is viewed as a statement of scientific policy or a statement of public policy, it does seem to be immaterial from the perspective of the desirability of statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis. In either case, the consequences appear
to be the same. The Delaney Clause was based on the state of scientific knowledge and testing capabilities at the various times it
was incorporated in the food additives, animal drug and color additives laws. At that time, for example, saccharin was considered
generally recognized as safe and not even a probable candidate for
application of the Delaney Clause. Later studies, however, demonstrated saccharin's capacity for inducing cancer in laboratory animals. The issue was drawn, and the agency could not consider its
benefits in light of its costs. In general terms Congress had done
this in the Delaney Clause without having saccharin in mind.
With this history in mind, a statutory barrier in an area requiring considerable expertise and state of the art medical and scientific judgments seems undesirable. This is aggravated when
medicine and science are constantly expanding and improving in
their ability to measure and predict the effects and consequences
of use of substances in food.
Furthermore, the lessons of the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases
discussed in the preceding part are highlighted by the Delaney
Clause and its history. The Delaney Clause is an example of a true
statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis. It is characterized by
much more than specificity of congressional action. On its face the
Clause manifests an intent to preclude cost/benefit analysis, yet it
falls short of specific and express preclusion. In that respect it may
seem similar to numerous other specific limitations on agency discretion, which constitute at most partial statutory barriers. What
does set the Delaney Clause apart is the language of the statute,
157. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1452 (1977).
158. Act of June 17, 1980, Pub. L. 96-273, 94 Stat. 536; Act of Aug. 14, 1981, Pub. L.
97-42, 95 Stat. 946.
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buttressed by a legislative history and subsequent judicial and administrative record which makes clear that cost/benefit analysis is
not to be employed in certain matters of food safety.
C.

Control of Toxic Substances

The Toxic Substances Control Act was enacted in 1976.L59 Its
fundamental purpose was to regulate chemical substances and
mixtures which present unreasonable risks of harm to health or the
environment. 1 0
Notwithstanding the public protection goals of the Act, Congress
was cognizant of the costs in dealing effectively with toxic substances. Thus, in its statement of policy Congress declared that
authority over chemical substances and mixtures should be exercised in
such a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation while fulfilling the primary purpose of this
chapter to assure that such innovation and commerce in such chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment.
(c) Intent of Congress.-It is the intent of Congress that the Administrator
[of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)] shall carry out this chapter in a reasonable and prudent manner, and that the Administrator shall
consider the environmental, economic, and social impact of any
action the
6
Administrator takes or proposes to take under this chapter.' '

This congressional expression of policy and intent represents a
sympathetic posture toward the costs as well as the benefits in the
regulation of toxic substances. Many examples of the necessity and
desirability of administrative weighing of costs and benefits are included in the statute.
An important exception to this basic attitude and approach is
the statutory provision dealing with polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs):
(1) Within six months after January 1, 1977, the Administrator shall promulgate rules to(A) prescribe methods for the disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls,
(B) require polychlorinated biphenyls to be marked with clear and adequate
warnings, and instructions with respect to their processing, distribution in
commerce, use, or disposal or with respect to any combination of such
activities.
159. Act of Oct. 11, 1976, Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003, codified at i5 U.S.C. §§ 260129 (1982).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (1982) (findings). See S. REP. No. 94-698, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4491.
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601(b)(3), (c) (1982).
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Requirements prescribed by rules under this paragraph shall be consistent
with the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3).
(2)(A) Except as provided under subparagraph (B), effective one year after
January 1, 1977, no person may manufacture, process, or distribute in commerce or use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any manner other than in a
totally enclosed manner.
(B) The Administrator may by rule authorize the manufacture, processing,
distribution in commerce or use .. .of any polychlorinated biphenyl in a
manner other than in a totally enclosed manner if the Administrator finds
that such manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, or use . . .
will not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.
(C) For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "totally enclosed manner"
means any manner which will ensure that any exposure of human beings or
the environment to a polychlorinated biphenyl will be insignificant as determined by the Administrator by rule.
(3)(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C)(i) no person may manufacture any polychlorinated biphenyl after two years
after January 1, 1977, and
(ii) no person may process or distribute in commerce any polychlorinated
biphenyl after two and one-half years after such date.
(B) Any person may petition the Administrator for an exemption from the
requirements of subparagraph (A), and the Administrator may grant by rule
such exemption if the Administrator finds that(i) an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment would not result,
and
(ii) good faith efforts have been made to 'develop a chemical substance
which does not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment and which may be substituted for such polychlorinated biphenyl.
An exemption granted under this subparagraph shall be subject to such
terms and conditions as the Administrator may prescribe and shall be in
effect for such period (but not more than one year from the date it is
granted) as the Administrator may prescribe.
(C) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the distribution in commerce of
any polychlorinated biphenyl if such polychlorinated biphenyl was sold for
purposes other than resale before two and one-half years after October 11,
1976.162

Although the statute does confer discretion in several important
respects, the fundamental and most important application of principles of cost/benefit analysis has been made by Congress. It and
not its delegate determined that PCBs lack sufficient merit, represent sufficient risk, and thus justify drastic governmental action. What this statute "imposes [is] a statutory ban on the manufacture, processing or distribution of 'polychlorinated biphenyls'
('PCBs'), subject to limited administrative exemption . . .-.
162. Id. § 2605(e)(1),(2),(3).
163. Dow Chem. Corp. v. Costle, 484 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D. Del. 1980).
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An interesting characteristic of this statutory barrier is its "rolling" nature. Congress did not impose an immediate total ban of
PCBs. Instead it prescribed a ban of increasing severity which was
to unfold over a two and one-half year period, and it was in the
unfolding of the ban that the Administrator was given some discretionary authority to relieve industry from its impact. The objective
was nevertheless clear. As Congressman Broyhill observed in debate on this legislation, the statute
sets out a timetable for regulating PCB's culminating in a ban on the
processing or distribution in commerce of PCB's 21/2 years after the effective date of this act. The purpose of this ban is to preclude the manufacture, processing or distribution in commerce of new PCB's or new equipment containing PCB's in 21/2 years after the effective date of this act.'"

Furthermore, the statute left much to the Administrator beyond
implementation of the rolling ban. The widespread use and persistent nature of PCBs left much to be done in the future with respect to PCBs already in existence. The result was extensive ad65
ministrative regulations pertaining to PCBs.
Not surprisingly, some of these regulations came under attack as
the Administrator attempted to be reasonable and practical, as a
result of either his own inclinations, industry pressure or both. The
result was a test of the efficacy of the statutory barriers to cost/
benefit analysis in connection with the PCB problem.
Not long after their promulgation the Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) instituted a proceeding for judicial review of various
provisions of the EPA's rules concerning PCBs. Specifically, EDF
challenged the validity of EPA's classification of certain uses of
PCBs as "totally enclosed," its exclusion from regulatory control of
materials containing PCBs in concentrations of fifty parts per million or less, and its authorization of continuation of certain uses
1 66
not totally enclosed.
With respect to the issue last mentioned, EDF contended that
the Administrator had employed the wrong standard in authorizing certain non-totally enclosed uses and making a determination
that these uses would not involve unreasonable risk to health or
the environment. 16 7 The court concluded that it was reasonable
'122 CONG. REC. 11,344 (1976).
165. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 761.1-761.185 (1983). The regulations address such
matters as definitions, prohibitions, authorizations, markings, storage and disposal of PCBs.
166. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
167. Id. at 1275. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (1982), which permits "reasonably ascertainable economic consequences . . . after consideration of the effect on the national econ164.

1985

Administrative Cost/Benefit Analysis

and permissible for the Administrator to bring to bear the standard for risk assessment generally applicable to other chemical
substances under the Act. The latter affords an opportunity for
cost/benefit analysis, and the court noted that "this formulation,
which considers a broad range of benefits and costs of the ban and
use authorization, is entirely consistent with the . . . requirement
that the Administrator consider the economic and social impact of
his actions."' 6 8
The court was not speaking of the PCBs provision in its entirety.
The opportunity for cost/benefit recognized here was confined to a
limited area in which it was reasonable to conclude that Congress
had intended that economic consequences be taken into account.
The decision in other respects established the true strength of the
statutory barriers in this provision.
When the court turned its attention to the fifty parts per million
line which the Administrator had drawn for regulatory purposes, it
was necessary to deal with the statutory language which addressed
"any polychlorinated biphenyl." The EPA had selected this line
for enforcement convenience and due to its fear of adverse impact
on commercial products and "municipal sludges." 16 9 Although the
court was reluctant to take the language literally "to require EPA
to regulate every molecule of PCB . . .absent support in the legislative history, ' 170 it did conclude that Congress did intend to control non-ambient sources of PCBs. In this light and as to these
sources, the fifty parts per million line was impermissible. Congress
had expressed its will that even "inadvertent commercial production of PCBs. . .be regulated,' ' 7 1 and the agency had no choice in
the matter. The statutory barrier to agency application of principles of cost/benefit analysis was to be honored, although Congress
required judicial assistance to assure that its intent was realized.
The provisions concerning PCBs in the Toxic Substances Control Act in most respects represent a statutory barrier to application of principles of cost/benefit analysis in the form of a ban. The
PCB problem was perceived by Congress as too obvious, too immediate and too important to leave to the agency.
Yet the terms of the statute illustrate the difficulty of imposing
omy, small business, [and] technological innovation . ." to be taken into account.
168. %36 F.2d at 1276-77.
169. Id. at 1280.
170. Id. at 1281.
171. Id. at 1282. The court also found that the evidence in the record was insufficient
to support the classification of certain uses as totally enclosed. Id. at 1284-86.

522

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:489

an immediate ban. The rolling nature of the PCBs provisions demonstrates that immediate imposition of a ban, especially in a case
involving a longstanding and long-used substance, may be impossible. The costs of the ban must be considered no matter how beneficial the outcome. For this reason the phased-in ban is not surprising. It simply reflects the congressional inclination to be realistic
and spread at least some of the costs into the future. Consequently, Congress found it necessary to give some discretion to the
agency to oversee this aspect of the ban. But the significant point
is that the terms of the ban and the corresponding weighing of
costs and benefits were established by Congress and not the
agency.
The PCBs provision also illustrates that a statutory barrier may
be undesirable from the perspective of Congress in that failure is
more conspicuous. If an agency has authority to engage in cost/
benefit analysis, it may not be as obvious that the stated objective
has not been or never will be reached. And, when failure is perceived in the efficacy of a statutory barrier, Congress must shoulder more of the blame than is customary when agencies are criticized. As the court in the case just discussed noted:
We feel constrained to add one final note to emphasize our concern in this
case. Human beings have finally come to recognize that they must eliminate
or control life threatening chemicals, such as PCBs, if the miracle of life is
to continue and if earth is to remain a living planet. This is precisely what
Congress sought to do when it enacted section 6(c) of the Toxic Substances
Control Act. Yet, as we find that forty-six months after the effective date of
an act designed to either totally ban or closely control the use of PCBs, 99%
of the PCBs that were in use when the Act was passed are still in use in the
United States. With information such as this in hand, timid souls have good
reason to question the prospects for our continued survival, and cynics have
72
just cause to sneer at the effectiveness of governmental regulation.

It seems difficult to attribute this only to agency ineptitude and to
resolve it by scheduling oversight hearings. Congress itself struck
the balance between costs and benefits in the statute, and certainly
it sided significantly with health and the environment as to PCBs.
But if critics deem its efforts inadequate, Congress must bear the
primary responsibility and answer the critics. This may be desirable or undesirable, depending on one's perspective and position of
the moment.
The treatment of PCBs under the Toxic Substances Control Act
represents an absolute statutory barrier as to the ban and, as
172.

Id. at 1286-87.
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noted, a "rolling" barrier in its implementation. As in the case of
the Delaney Clause, the fact of the barrier's existence cannot be
attributed exclusively to the specificity of the statute. One also
must look to the other provisions in the statute which intentionally
require cost/benefit analysis in other substantive settings.
D.

Mine Closure

By nature mines are dangerous workplaces; it is thus not surprising that congressional initiative, public pressure, or both have addressed the matter of mine safety. The most obvious and drastic
course of action with respect to an unsafe mine is to close it, permanently or until such time as the unsafe conditions are rectified.
In the history of mine controls in this country, Congress has considered and in various ways implemented these alternatives. In the
process, it has considered and sometimes employed the statutory
barrier to cost/benefit analysis by agencies entrusted with overseeing mine safety.
The particular statutory barriers presented in this part provide
an opportunity to observe Congress experimenting with the statutory barrier as a means of administrative control. The record indicates the difficulty of controlling administrative discretion even in
the presence of a statutory barrier and suggests that the mere existence of an agency constitutes a grant of considerable discretionary
power which, as a practical matter, is difficult if not impossible to
control.
Congressional interest in mine safety and regulation is not new.
A mining bill was proposed as early as 1865, but little was done
until the early twentieth century when a series of mine disasters
led to the establishment of the Bureau of Mines in 1910.173 In
1966, Congress enacted the Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine
Safety Act; it was motivated by its concern for safety in the workplace: "The number and severity of the injuries experienced each
year by persons employed in the extractive industries should be
alarming to an America that prides itself on its. . . concern for the
1 74
welfare of its citizens."
The 1966 Act contained a provision illustrative of the statutory
barriers. Section 727(a) provided:
173.

See S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.

CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3401.

174.

S. REp. No. 1296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 2846, 2850.
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If, upon any inspection or investigation of a mine which is subject to this
chapter, an authorized representative of the Secretary finds that conditions
or practices in such mine are such that a danger exists which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or
before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated, such representative
shall determine the extent of the area of such mine throughout which the
danger exists, and thereupon issue an order requiring the operator of such
mine to cause all persons, except the following persons [as identified in sec.
727(a)(1)] whose presence in such area is necessary to eliminate the danger
described in such order, to be withdrawn from, and to be debarred from,
1 75
entering such area.

The "Secretary" in this instance was the Secretary of the
17
Interior. 1
What Congress sought to accomplish with this provision was a
mandate for mine closure under certain prescribed circumstances.
The agency necessarily was granted the task of determining when
conditions could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
physical harm and whether these conditions existed only in part or
all of a mine, but the statute conferred no express discretion to
weigh the costs of closure versus the benefits of safety. The administrative function delegated was not one of making rules to deal
with mine safety under a broad delegation of authority; rather it
was one of inspection to identify specified dangers and
enforcement.
In 1977, section 727(a) and the remainder of the 1966 Act were
repealed by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act
which themselves represented amendments to the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.177 In practice, the Metal and
Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act had come to be viewed as more advisory in nature; its ineffectiveness was noted by the Senate which
determined that in 1975, nine years after its enactment, there had
not been one appeal from an adverse determination of the Secretary.178 Obviously, the affected industry had not been particularly
disenchanted with enforcement of the 1966 Act.
The Senate concluded that in part this situation was attributa175. Act of Sept. 16, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-577, § 8(a), 80 Stat. 775, repealed by Act of
Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1322.
176. Id. § 721(d).
177. Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1322, codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
801-78 (1982). The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was enacted in 1969 and in
some measure reflected disenchantment with the efficacy of the Metal and Nonmetallic
Mine Safety Act. See Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742-43.
178. S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3401, 3406.
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ble to a conflict inherent in assigning responsibility for mine safety
to the Secretary of the Interior. The desire to increase production
was in tension with the need to interrupt production for safety reasons. Thus, one of the changes under the 1977 Act was to transfer
mine safety to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor because
"no conflict could result if the responsibility for enforcing and administering the mine safety and health law was assigned to the Department of Labor since that department has as its sole duty the
protection of workers and insuring of safe and healthful working
conditions. '"179
The role previously performed by section 727(a) was assigned to
section 814 under the 1977 Act. The relevant portions of the latter
statute are not without statutory barriers to application of principles of cost/benefit analysis, although their overall impact suggests
less specificity of congressional action than section 727(a) and
greater reliance on the presumed objectivity and independence of
the Secretary of Labor. These relevant subsections of the new provision generally encompass what section 727(a) once did.18 0 There
179.

S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD.NEWS 3401, 3405.

180. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 814(a), (b), (d)(1) (1982):
(a) Issuance and form of citations;prompt issuance
If, upon inspection or investigation, the Secretary or his authorized representative
believes that an operator of a coal or other mine. . . has violated this chapter, or any
mandatory health or safety standard, rule, order, or regulation . . . he shall, with
reasonable promptness, issue a citation to the operator. . . . [T]he citation shall fix a
reasonable time for abatement of the violation ....
(b) Follow-up inspections;findings
If, upon any follow-up inspection . . .an authorized representative of the Secretary
finds (1) that a violation described in a citation . . . has not been totally abated
within the period of time as originally fixed therein or as subsequently extended, and
(2) that the period of time for abatement should not be further extended, he shall
determine the extent of the area affected by the violation and shall promptly issue an
order requiring the operator of such mine or his agency to immediately cause all persons, except those referred to in subsection (c) [comparable to section 727(a)(1) of the
1966 Act and is confined to persons necessary for dealing with the conditions to be
abated] to be withdrawn from, and to be prohibited from entering, such area until an
authorized representative of the Secretary determines that such violation has been
abated.
(d) Findings of violations; withdrawal order
(1) If, upon any inspection .. .an authorized representative of the Secretary finds
that there has been a violation of any mandatory health or safety standard, and if he
also finds that, while the conditions created by such violation do not cause imminent
danger, such violation is of such nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard, and if
he finds such violation to be caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator to
comply with such mandatory health or safety standards, he shall include such finding
in any citation given to the operator . . . .If during the same inspection or any sub-
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is little doubt that the new provisions afford greater administrative
discretion than the 1966 Act. Close inspection, however, of the
statute reveals that significant statutory barriers remain.
Section 814(a) provides for citation upon finding of a violation
with a reasonable time for abatement, and section 814(b) provides
for closure of the mine if on follow-up inspection the violation in
the original citation has not been totally abated. The latter provision clearly provides no opportunity for inspectional cost/benefit
analysis in the course of a follow-up inspection; however, section
814(a) might be taken as precluding closure of a mine during an
initial inspection, no matter how dangerous and life-threatening
the violation-that a reasonable time must always be allowed for
abatement and more than a moment is needed to be reasonable. A
close reading of section 814(d)(1) suggests the contrary. The manner in which the term "imminent danger" is employed in that provision suggests that even on an initial inspection a determination
of imminent danger requires immediate closure of a mine. There is
no opportunity for the inspector to engage in cost/benefit analysis
just as there was none under the 1966 Act.
The difficulty with this interpretation is that until the 1977
amendments, section 814(a) included an "imminent danger" standard for mine closure.""1 This was deleted in 1977. Perhaps the
continued inclusion of this language in section 814(d)(1) was more
oversight than a continuation of the policy only with respect to
withdrawal orders under that section. But it seems likely that the
"reasonable time" to be allowed under section 814(a) for abatement could be as little as a moment when mine roofing supports
are on the verge of collapse. If so, the absence of the "imminent
danger" standard may be of little consequence, although determining reasonableness carries with it a degree of discretion. It is for
that reason somewhat less a statutory barrier.
Section 814(d)(1) also contains its own version of a statutory
barrier, and even during an initial inspection the inspector may
sequent inspection of such mine within 90 days after the issuance of such citation, an
authorized representative of the Secretary finds another violation of any mandatory
health or safety standard and finds such violation to be also caused by an unwarrantable failure of such operator to so comply, he shall forthwith issue an order requiring
the operator to cause all persons in the area affected by such violation, except those
persons referred to in subsection (c) . . . to be withdrawn from, and to be prohibited
from entering, such area until an authorized representative . . . determines that such
violation has been abated.
Id.
181.

Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, Title 1, § 104, 83 Stat. 742, 750.
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have no choice but to issue a withdrawal order. If he finds an unwarrantable violation which threatens safety or health, although
not imminently dangerous, he must include such in the citation
issued. But if during that inspection he finds another unwarrantable violation, the inspector must issue a withdrawal order. Admittedly there appears to be some discretion in determining what constitutes an "unwarrantable" violation, but there is none concerning
what must be done once that finding is made. The withdrawal order must be issued and the mine closed.
It should be noted that the intensity and efficacy of the statutory barrier appear to be a function of the nature of the violation
which might precipitate a withdrawal order. In an early case under
the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act not involving imminent danger, the court found that the statute afforded the discretion to hold
an administrative hearing before closure of a mine; otherwise the
Act "would indeed face serious claims of deprival of due pro' In such cases, not involving imminent danger, it cannot be
cess."182
said that the statute constitutes a statutory barrier in the course of
inspection if closure of the mine must await an administrative
hearing.
In contrast, a true statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis by
the inspector would exist only if the conditions at the mine are of a
magnitude sufficient to require immediate action without a prior
hearing. What is required to constitute a true statutory barrier is a
situation in which the inspector has no choice but to close the
mine immediately.

183

What the 1977 amendments appear to have done is reduce the
clarity and efficacy of the statutory barriers to discretionary cost/
benefit analysis in the course of mine inspections. But, as just discussed, the statutory barriers were not eliminated entirely. There
are still those situations in which it is clear that the inspector has
no alternative except to order immediate withdrawal from a mine.
Indeed, in one instance the effect of the replacement of the
Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act by the 1977 amendments
was to add a new statutory barrier which is as clear and unequivocal as any now in the statute. Section 814(g)(1) provides:
If, upon any inspection or investigation

..

the Secretary or an authorized

182. Lucas v. Morton, 358 F. Supp. 900, 903 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
183. Under traditional notions of summary administrative action in emergency situations it would be permissible and consistent with due process for the hearing to take place
after closure of the mine. See, e.g., Sink v. Morton, 529 F.2d 601, 604 (4th Cir. 1975).
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representative shall find employed at a coal or other mine a miner who has
not received the requisite safety training as determined under section 825 of
this title, the Secretary or an authorized representative shall issue an order
. . . which declares such miner to be a hazard to himself and to others, and
requiring that such miner be immediately withdrawn from the coal or other
mine, and be prohibited from entering such mine until an authorized representative of the Secretary determines that such miner has received the
training required by section 825 of this title." 4

Here there is no uncertainty. The mine's immediate need for the
untrained miner is not relevant. The inspector must order withdrawal from the mine.
The interesting feature of the various statutory barriers concerning mine closure is the timing of their impact. If applicable, the
barrier precludes cost/benefit analysis at one of the earliest phases
of the administrative process. These are not barriers limiting the
agency in the course of rulemaking or adjudication of individual
cases. Rather, they confine discretion to the early phase of investigation and inspection.
Furthermore, these are statutory barriers the effect of which is
felt most drastically by agency operating personnel. It will not be
the Secretary of Labor who will be at the mine site; it will be a line
employee. Consequently, the barrier may be especially useful. It
reduces uncertainty for the inspector because what is expected is
often clear. It may also be useful in reducing pressure from mine
operators for the inspector to engage in ad hoc cost/benefit analysis during an inspection. Opportunities for such, if they exist at all,
will arise later in the administrative process and presumably at a
higher level.
None of this, however, explains why Congress itself should create
these barriers. The agency should be capable of doing the same.
Yet when Congress creates the barrier it is more difficult to alter
and the agency itself may be relieved of pressure to reach contrary
results administratively. This could be the principal advantage of
statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis in connection with mine
inspections.
These statutory barriers, however, are unlike those reflected in
the Delaney Clause or in the Toxic Substances Control Act with
respect to PCBs. The barriers here are more implicit in nature.
There is nothing to indicate that Congress made a conscious decision to preclude cost/benefit analysis; rather it establishes firm
guidance on what was to be done in certain situations in the course
184.

30 U.S.C. § 814(g)(1) (1982).
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of mine inspections, notwithstanding any pleas from a mine operator to "consider the costs." This does not seem to make it any less
a barrier. Certainly the economist would consider it such, although
a lawyer may not. But the mine closure provisions involve more
than prosecutorial discretion. As with the Delaney Clause, which
dictates that under certain defined circumstances a food additive
must be banned, the mine closure provisions dictate that under
certain circumstances the mine must be closed without regard to
cost. Whatever discretion remains is merely that residual "discretion" to ignore the closure mandate with the hope that the abuse
of discretion will not be noticed and challenged.
E.

Commodity Marketing Quotas

The most complex and frequently amended statutory barriers to
cost/benefit analysis included in these case studies are those found
in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.185 As a byproduct of
this statute, terms such as "parity," "price support," "acreage allotment," and commodity "marketing quota" have become entrenched in the lexicon of American agriculture. It is not an unimportant statute.
The purpose here is to identify a few of the statutory barriers
representative of the legislative approach taken in the 1938 Act,
although it is worth emphasizing that throughout the Act Congress
elected to specify in considerable detail just what the Secretary of
Agriculture is entitled to do and how he is to do it. This is not to
say that no discretion is conferred on the agency, but this statute
is at the opposite end of the spectrum from those where Congress
in broad terms charges an agency to deal with a matter "in the
public interest, convenience and necessity."
The general intent of Congress in enacting the Agricultural Adjustment Act is reflected in its statutory declaration of policy
which provides:
It is declared to be the policy of Congress to continue the Soil Conservation
and Domestic Allotment Act, as amended, for the purpose of conserving national resources, preventing the wasteful use of soil fertility, and of preserving, maintaining, and rebuilding the farm and ranch resources in the national public interest; to accomplish these purposes through the
encouragement of soil-building and soil-conserving crops and practices; to
assist in the marketing of agricultural commodities for domestic consumption and for export; and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in cot-

185.

See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1982).
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ton, wheat, corn, tobacco, and rice to the extent necessary to provide an
orderly, adequate, and balanced flow of such commodities in interstate and
foreign commerce through storage of reserve supplies, loans, marketing quotas, assisting farmers to obtain, insofar as practicable, parity prices for such
commodities and parity of income, and assisting consumers to obtain an
adequate and steady supply of such commodities at fair prices."'

In its efforts to achieve its stated objectives Congress addressed
each of the specified crops individually, and made specific findings
concerning the effects on interstate and foreign commerce and the
need for regulation. With respect to wheat it emphasized the large
number of farmers producing wheat, the undesirable and harmful
consequences of "abnormally excessive and abnormally deficient
supplies,"'18 7 the inadequacy of normal market forces in avoiding
these problems and thus the necessity for federal intervention, and
the need for fair prices for consumers and farmers.
Under the statutory scheme for wheat the Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to declare each year that supplies are likely to
be excessive in the absence of a marketing quota program and, for
that reason, to institute such a program.' 8 8 The Secretary is given
the further power to proclaim a national acreage allotment for each
crop of wheat based on the number of acres necessary to produce
the quantity set under the national marketing quota. 8 9
Section 1334 is central to the statutory scheme and addresses
apportionment of the national acreage allotment for wheat. Section
1334 has been amended with remarkable frequency-some twentysix times. 90 In its present form the statute guides the Secretary
carefully through the process of allotment. It specifies that reserves
are not to exceed one percent and that the allotment among the
states must be based on the preceding year's allotment, subject to
adjustment to assure fair and equitable apportionment.' 9' The entire section and its intricacies need not be repeated here, but
throughout one finds instances in which Congress instructs that an
allotment must be "less by at least 20 percentum," "at least 10
percentum," "not in excess of one million acres," not "in excess of
one-half of such county average ratio" and so on. The specificity
and complexity are remarkable, and in each instance the effect is
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

7 U.S.C. § 1282 (1982).
Id. § 1331.
Id. § 1332.
Id. § 1333.
See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (1973 & 1983 Supp.).
7 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1982).
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to limit the discretion of the Secretary in his efforts to achieve the
objectives of the Act. Each in its fashion stands as a potential barrier to cost/benefit analysis.
Section 1334 has proved, as noted, to be a provision requiring
constant adjustment and "fine tuning." Throughout this process it
seems that two considerations have necessitated change-the increasing cost of the allotment program and the increasing productive capacity of wheat producers. For example, in 1953 Congress
passed temporary legislation raising the national allotment to
sixty-one million acres to avoid reducing planted acreage by almost
thirty percent. This was in response to the effect of the statute
which would have provided an allotment of only fifty-five million
acres. Congress concluded that putting a large number of wheat
farmers out of business was in the best interests of neither the nation nor the world.1 92 But the significant point for present purposes
is that the nature of the statute required legislation and not administrative action to make the necessary assessment of costs versus benefits.
In 1958 the section was amended to make adjustments made
necessary when the apparently unanticipated effects of a 1957
amendment became evident. 9 ' The 1957 statute provided that any
acreage seeded to wheat for harvest as grain for 1958 and thereafter in excess of allotments would not be considered in setting future acreage allotments.' The 1958 amendment prevented application of this principle to the 1958 crop because farmers did not
have adequate notice of the change when they voted on 1958 acreage allotments and when they planted their winter acreage. In effect the 1957 statute had changed the rules in midgame, and the
1958 legislation corrected the problem. It took congressional action
to make the correction.
On occasion- Congress has suspended the applicability of section
1334 and moved on to experiment with other means of dealing
with production and supply problems in wheat as well as other agricultural commodities. The section was suspended and declared
inapplicable for the period from 1971 to 1977.19' Congress took
similar suspending action and declared the section inapplicable for
192. S. REP. No. 520, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1877.
193. Act of April 4, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-366, § 1, 72 Stat. 78.
194. Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-203, § 2, 71 Stat. 477.
195. Act of Nov. 30, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, Title IV, § 404(1), 84 Stat. 1366, as
amended, Act of Aug. 10, 1973, § 1(11), 87 Stat. 229.
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the 1982-1985 wheat crops.'
This general description of the commodity marketing quota and
acreage allotment program for wheat is illustrative of congressional
programs for other commodities such as tobacco, cotton, corn and
rice.197 Typical of each is a high degree of specificity in the congressional mandate to the Secretary of Agriculture and an attendant reduction in administrative discretion and the opportunity to
engage in cost/benefit analysis.
Perhaps it is imperative in the politics of agriculture that Congress take an active and specific role in the formulation of agricultural policy. It may be impolitic to delegate agricultural problems
to an administrative official without specific guidance. It may be
that the Department of Agriculture is quite content to have these
sensitive judgments made by Congress. It may be that the Department would not want to engage in cost/benefit analysis even where
it might. However, the history of congressional control over the
wheat markets suggests that the political realities may not produce
the most efficient and effective agricultural policy.
The traditional approach has been for Congress itself to weigh
the costs and benefits of different approaches to agricultural
problems, to design a statute to reflect the balance struck and to
delegate lesser matters to the Secretary of Agriculture for implementation of the policies it has set. As an abstract proposition this
approach has some appeal. It is certainly more democratic as well
as politically realistic, but the frequent necessity for statutory
change indicates that these matters require a level of continuing
supervision in the weighing of costs and benefits which an agency
is more able to provide.
Too much significance should not be attached to the fact that
Congress did devote attention to the need for statutory amendments on a regular basis. There is no way of being certain that it
did so in all cases where it was needed; Congress may have been
simply doing other important things and turning to marketing
quotas only when absolutely necessary. In addition, the number of
amendments is probably a symptom of underlying problems. It
may be that intrusive economic regulation is especially disrupted
by statutory barriers because of the complexity and fluidity of the
economy itself, and if such regulation is desired, statutory barriers
196. Act of Dec. 22, 1981, Pub. L. 97-98, Title III,§ 303, 95 Stat. 1227.
197. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1311-30 (1982) (tobacco); id. §§ 1311-16 (cotton); id. §§ 1321-30
(corn); id. §§ 1351-56 (rice).
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should be avoided.
These barriers are another example of implicit rather than explicit barriers which are a product of the specificity of the statute
without evidence that Congress intentionally constricted the Department's capacity to engage in cost/benefit analysis. Nevertheless, this is an area of economic policy and regulation in which
cost/benefit analysis is necessary and even inevitable and in which
Congress has elected to perform the fundamental analysis itself.
F. Prevailing Wage Rates in Government Contracts and
Grants
A common provision in statutes pertaining to government contracts and grants is one which establishes a minimum for wages to
be paid by outside contractors and grant recipients. Generally the
wages are tied to a determination of locally prevailing rates.
Provisions of this nature are found in a variety of statutes, rang' pollution preing from contracts and grants relating to Indians, 98
' contracts for conversion of leased postal facilivention grants, 99
00
ties,
to Housing and Urban Development contracts and
subcontracts. 01 However, the precedent, model and primary source
of the prevailing wage rate principle throughout federal law is the
2
20
Davis-Bacon Act.

The Davis-Bacon Act was enacted on March 3, 1931. Originally
the objective was an emergency price measure. The history of the
legislation indicates that the primary objective was to provide
some form of relief from abuses in the extensive building and construction programs created in response to the Depression. 20

'

De-

bate focused on unscrupulous contractors who would submit bids
based on cheap "imported" labor to obtain government contracts.
The concerns voiced were basically twofold. First, there was the
obvious concern on the effect of such bids on local workers and the
impact of their unemployment on taxes and domestic life. Second,
there was concern with the treatment and conditions which the imported workers were often forced to endure. Obviously there was
some opposition to this legislation, but generally it had considerable support. Proponents pointed to the fact that many municipali198.
199.

25 U.S.C. §§ 450(e), 1612(b)(1) (1982).
33 U.S.C. § 1372 (1982).

200.

39 U.S.C. § 410(d) (1982).

201.
202.
203.

42 U.S.C. § 3310 (1982).
Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 441, 46 Stat. 1494, codified at 40 U.S.C. § 2762 (1982).
74 CONG. REc. 6505 (1931).
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ties and states already had similar statutes.20 '
In 1964 the Davis-Bacon Act was amended to take into account
the increasing significance of fringe benefits in total employee compensation since 1931.205 Thus, the amendments allowed consideration of benefits such as group life insurance, group hospitalization,
and disability programs.210 The view was that if these benefits were
not included, only part of compensation would be reflected in the
prevailing wage rates. Yet there was concern that the amendment
20 7
would adversely affect the government-by way of increased costs.
The Senate Committee acknowledged that there would be increased costs, including administrative costs in the Department of
Labor in making prevailing wage determinations. In 1963, for example, the Department issued 46,000 prevailing wage determinations involving 5,000,000 job classifications. But the Committee believed that administrative improvement such as the creation of a
Wage Appeals Board with jurisdiction over such cases would mitigate the financial impact of the amendments. 20 8 In any event it
seems certain that Congress believed the benefits of prevailing
wage rate controls outweighed any additional costs.
Section 276a, the central provision in the Davis-Bacon Act
provides:
The advertised specifications for every contract in excess of $2,000, to which
the United States or the District of Columbia is a party, for construction,
alteration, and/or repair, including painting and decorating, of public buildings or public works. . . and which requires or involves the employment of
mechanics and/or laborers shall contain a provision stating the minimum
wages to be paid various classes of laborers and mechanics which shall be
based upon the wages that will be determined by the Secretary of Labor to
be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on projects of a character similar to the contract work in the city,
town, village, or other civil subdivision of the State, in which the work is to
be performed . . .; and every contract based upon these specifications shall
contain a stipulation that the contractor or his subcontractor shaUl pay all
mechanics and laborers employed directly upon the site of the work, unconditionally and not less often than once a week, and without subsequent deduction or rebate on any account, the full amounts accrued at time of pay-

204.
205.

Id. at 6510.
Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-349, 78 Stat. 238, codified at 40 U.S.C. §

276a(b) (1982).
206. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2341 (citing S. REP. No. 963, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964)). See 40 U.S.C. § 276a(b) (1982).
207. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2341, 2342 (citing S. REP. No. 963, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964)).
208. Id. at 2343.
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ment, computed at wage rates not less than those stated in the advertised
specifications, regardless of any contractual relationship which may be alleged to exist between the contractor or subcontractor and such laborers
and mechanics, and that the scale of wages to be paid shall be posted by the
contractor in a prominent and easily accessible place at the site of work;
and the further stipulation that there may be withheld from the contractor
so much of accrued payments as may be considered necessary by the contracting officer to pay to laborers and mechanics employed by the contractor
or any subcontractor on the work the difference between the rates of wages
required by the contract to be paid .. .and the rates of wages received by
such laborers and mechanics and not refunded to the contractor, subcontractors, or their agents. 0 9,

The sanctions for failure to comply with these prevailing wage rate
requirements include termination of the contract,2 10 payment of
excess costs incurred by the government in completion of the terminated contract project,2 1 payment of the amounts owed laborers
and mechanics from accrued payments otherwise due the contractor,2" 2 and a ban on any other contracts with the government for
213
three years.
These provisions represent a pervasive and significant statutory
barrier to the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis. No
matter how attractive the prospect of substantial savings on government contracts by retaining contractors who pay less than prevailing wages, an agency has little discretion to favor savings to the
government over prevailing wages to workers. This is consistent
with the purposes of the Davis-Bacon Act which "was not enacted
to benefit contractors [and indirectly the public fisc], but rather to
protect their employees from substantial earnings losses by fixing a
floor under wages on Government projects."2 " " It was designed to
protect workers from those contractors inclined to import cheap
labor to work on government contracts. 1 5
Nevertheless, the statute is not without opportunity for the exercise of discretion. There is a degree of discretion in the contracting
209. 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1982).
210. Id. § 276a-1. '
211. Id. Should the accrued payments prove insufficient, the statute specifies that the
laborers and mechanics have a right of action against the contractor. Id. § 276a-2(b).
212. Id. § 276a-2(a).
213. Id. See generally Warner, Congressionaland Administrative Efforts to Modify or
Eliminate the Davis-Bacon Act, 10 W. STATE L. REV. 1 (1982), for a discussion of the legislative history of the Act and recent administrative and legislative efforts to alter or repeal it.
214. United States v. Binghamton Const. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1954). See also
Building and Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 613-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
215. E.g., Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 774-80 (1981); Tennessee
Roadbuilders Ass'n v. Marshall, 446 F. Supp. 399, 400-01 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
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agencies as to applicable job classifications, as established by the
Secretary. This is subject to review by the Secretary. There is also
discretion inherent in the Secretary's establishment of classifications and prevailing wage rates.216 However, this discretion prevails
over a relatively narrow range within the framework of the statutory barrier.
It is established that there is no discretion to apply or not apply
the Act; if it does apply, it must be enforced.21 7 Furthermore, the
ability of a contracting agency or the Secretary to proceed in an
area within the reach of the Act in a manner inconsistent with its
purposes is tightly circumscribed.
Recently the limits and strength of this statutory barrier and the
corresponding limits on agency discretion have been tested in efforts by the Department of Labor to modify traditional prevailing
wage rate principles for the purpose of effecting cost savings. This
raised the question of whether the prevailing wage rate statute did
in fact preclude cost/benefit analysis. The judiciary was compelled
to resolve the matter.
The controversy arose when new regulations were promulgated
by the Secretary of Labor. The court of appeals described the effect of the changes:
Three of the new regulatory provisions of concern here would alter the
method for finding the prevailing wage. Another set of regulations would
allow federal contractors far greater freedom to use semi-skilled helpers on
projects than has previously been permitted. The Secretary asserts that this
expanded use of helpers would better reflect the practice on private
projects. The fifth provision is intended to ease the regulatory burden on
federal construction contractors by reducing the detail required in their
weekly submissions to the government regarding wages. All of the regulations under challenge are expected to reduce federal construction costs; the
Secretary has estimated that the last two provisions alone would save the
government or its contractors about $463 million per year.2 8

The district court which first considered the regulations was more
direct: "The new regulations will permit precisely that which Congress intended to halt in 1935." 19
216.

See, e.g., Universities Research Ass'n, 450 U.S. at 757-61, 771-83; North Ga.

Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. Goldschmidt, 621 F.2d 697, 701-05 (5th Cir. 1980); Associated Builders & Contractors of Texas Gulf Coast, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 451
F. Supp. 281, 283 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
217.

Cf. Universities Research Ass'n, 450 U.S. at 759-60.

218. Building & Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 975 (1984).

219. Building & Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D.D.C.
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The Secretary had determined that the cost to the government
of prevailing wage rates in government contracts now outweighed
the benefit of higher wages and thus, through the new regulations,
was attempting to strike a new balance. Seventeen unions asserted
that this was contrary to the principles of the Davis-Bacon Act.
The district court agreed with the unions and observed:
It is not for the Court to judge whether the basic policy decision to prefer
wage floors over expense to the government was or is wise. More to the
point, it is not for the Secretary of Labor or his subordinates to make that
judgment. Under our constitutional system, policy decisions are not made
by government administrators; they are made by the Congress.22

The preceding quote is taken from the district court's memorandum opinion in support of issuance of a preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of the rules. Subsequently the court considered the matter again on cross motions for summary judgment and
permanently enjoined enforcement of the new rules, with the exception of the rule which raised the percentage of employees in
each class of laborers and mechanics for purposes of defining prevailing wage rates. 221 Yet generally and not surprisingly the statutory barrier prevailed in the district court.
In a number of important respects the result was similar in the
court of appeals, but the Secretary was successful on some issues.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the elimination of the thirty percent rule was within the Secretary's discretion.22 2 It was, however, more selective concerning the other issues
in the case. It reversed on the aspect of the rules requiring that
22 3
urban and rural areas not be combined in wage determinations
and concluded that the Secretary's position was consistent with
legislative intent because he had been given sufficient discretion to
make the choice.224 It also concluded that the statute allowed the
Secretary to exclude wages paid on federal projects in the computation of prevailing wages, notwithstanding prior administrative
practice to the contrary.2 2 5
Concerning the treatment of helpers under the new rules the
court of appeals both agreed and disagreed with the district court.
1982).

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 1291.
Building & Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 553 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1982).
Building & Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 617-19.
Id. at 619-22.
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In its simplest terms the issue was whether lower paid helpers
could effectively replace higher skilled and paid workers in prevailing wage determinations. Part of what the Secretary wanted to do
was considered inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, but an
expanded definition of helpers was allowed.226
The district court was considerably more supportive of the statutory barriers than the court of appeals. The former was influenced by the administrative as well as legislative history of the
Act.2 27 Yet even though the court of appeals decision afforded
greater opportunity for the sway of cost/benefit analysis in the
agency, it did so within a range. Even its decision upheld the basic
precepts and underlying philosophy of Davis-Bacon, and the fundamentals of the statutory barrier prevailed.
The statutory barriers to costbenefit analysis in the prevailing
wage rate statute illustrate that the specificity of a statute may
determine the efficacy of the barrier. If some measure of discretion
is granted, there will be an opportunity for agency departure from
congressional intent.
In this instance the principles of the barrier were honored by the
agency and the courts for over four decades. Yet when the Secretary attempted to introduce principles of cost/benefit analysis
through rulemaking, the Secretary's margin of discretion permitted
some whittling away at the underlying intent of Congress. The
court of appeals was supportive of the Secretary in at least some
respects with the effect that greater weight is now placed on governmental costs than on the benefits to workers.
The message for Congress is that a modicum of discretion
granted in conjunction with a statutory barrier may provide the
opening for the introduction of a degree of cost/benefit analysis by
the agency. Thus, if Congress wishes to assure that the balance it
has struck between costs and benefits is not disturbed, it should
eliminate discretion whenever possible. If it cannot eliminate discretion, it should at least eliminate any avoidable ambiguity in the
statute. The Delaney Clause and its accompanying legislative history provide a contrasting model for how this can be accomplished.
The prevailing wage rate statute is instructive in other respects.
This barrier clearly was not created by Congress because the
226. Id. at 622-30. The court also affirmed the district court in declaring invalid a
simplified method for contractor reporting. Id. at 630-33.
227. See generally Building & Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 553 F. Supp. 352
(D.D.C. 1982); Building & Const. Trades' Dep't v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D.D.C.
1982).
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agency was not capable of weighing the costs and benefits in setting wages under government contracts. The task was one within
the competence of the agency. But more importantly it was a matter within the competence of Congress. Expertise is not pertinent
to determining that there must be limits to competition in the
wages reflected in government contracts.
Yet equality of institutional competence alone does not explain
why Congress did not delegate the matter to an agency. This statutory barrier reflects a political and social judgment which was important to significant segments of the public and to Congress, and
the statutory barrier is the best means of assuring that the judgment is preserved. The barrier prevents shifts in executive branch
policy as administrations come and go. It guarantees that if a shift
in policy is to take place, it must occur in Congress.
Davis-Bacon would be considered by economists as a legal constraint limiting alternatives subject to cost/benefit analysis. It
seems equally clear that the Act was similarly viewed and designed
by Congress. It is another of those cases which goes beyond mere
specificity. The balance between costs and benefits was struck by
Congress and subsequently recognized and generally supported by
the judiciary. One can readily predict how Department of Labor
officials would respond if asked whether their recent efforts to give
greater weight to the costs of prevailing wage rates have encountered a statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis. It is obvious that
they have.
G.

Transport of Explosive Materials

Chapter 7 of Title 46 of the Code concerns carriage of explosives
or dangerous substances on vessels. Included are provisions which
represent a statutory bar to carriage of certain materials without
opportunity for the exercise of agency discretion to relax or relieve
the prohibition:
(3) It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport, carry, convey, store, stow, or
use on board any vessel fulminates or other detonating compounds in bulk
in dry condition, or explosive compositions that ignite spontaneously or undergo marked decomposition when subjected for forty-eight consecutive
hours to a temperature of one hundred and sixty-seven degrees Fahrenheit,
or compositions containing an ammonium salt and a chlorate, or other like
explosives.
(4) It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport, carry, convey, store, stow or
use on board any passenger-carrying vessel any high explosives such as, and
including, liquid nitroglycerin, dynamite, trinitrotoluene, picrates, detonating fuses, fireworks that can be exploded enmasse, or other explosives sus-
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ceptible to detonation by a blasting cap or detonating fuse, except ship's
signal and emergency equipment, and samples of such explosives (but not
including liquid nitroglycerin) for laboratory or sales purposes in restricted
quantities as may be permitted by regulations of the Commandant of the
Coast Guard established hereunder2 28

These two provisions afford virtually no opportunity for the appli2 29
cation of principles of cost/benefit analysis.
These provisions on the transport of certain dangerous materials
on vessels are not of recent origin. They are modern vestiges of a
statutory scheme originally enacted on February 28, 1871 which
concerned transportation of hay, loose cotton, loose hemp, camphene, nitroglycerin or other explosive articles on steamers carrying passengers. The original statute also provided specific guidance
on the transport of certain of these materials which were not absolutely prohibited. For example, the statute indicated that cotton or
hemp which was transported on such vessels must be compactly
pressed and thoroughly covered with bagging of similar material.3 0
In 1940 the statute was revised in substantial measure to account for technological advances; the sections quoted above were
enacted in essentially their present form.2"' What is significant,
however, is that throughout the history of these statutory provisions there has been little in the way of conferred administrative
discretion. Indeed, the most significant change was in the transfer
of responsibility for inspection and enforcement from the Secretary of Commerce to the Coast Guard. 3 2
228. 46 U.S.C. § 170(3), (4) (1982). See also § 170(7)(e), which concerns permits for
loading or discharging explosives. This provision requires that such permits not be granted
unless state or local requirements are equalled or exceeded. It represents another limitation
on the ability of the Coast Guard to engage in cost/benefit analysis and the congressional
response to an explosion which occurred in South Amboy, New Jersey. Cf. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 52 (D.C.N.J. 1954).
229. 46 U.S.C. § 170(11) (1982) allows the Commandant of the Coast Guard to exempt
any vessel from provisions of section 170 upon finding, normally after public hearings, that
"the vessel, route, area of operations, conditions of the voyage or other circumstances" make
a statutory requirement unnecessary "for the purposes of safety." This would not, however,
seem to lift the strictures against cost/benefit analysis. Rather, it permits waiver of the
prohibitions of the statute when its purposes are inapplicable. Cf. Geotechnical Corp. v.
Pure Oil Co., 196 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1952).
230. Act of February 28, 1871 § 4, ch. 100, 16 Stat. 441 (1871). The 1871 statute also
prohibited the transport of gunpowder on passenger-carrying vessels except under special
license.
231. Act of October 9, 1940, ch. 777, 54 Stat. 1023 (1940).
232. In 1946 the Commandant of the Coast Guard replaced the Secretary of Commerce in these matters pertaining to "issuance of certificates of inspection, and of permits
indicating the approval of vessels for operations which may be hazardous to persons or
property ..
" 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3, § 104, 60 Stat. 730 (1946). What the 1946 Reorgani-
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The obvious congressional purpose in enacting these provisions
was to protect the public welfare and safety. It might have delegated this responsibility to an agency in broad terms. It did not,
and in the process created a statutory barrier to the application of
principles of cost/benefit analysis on the part of its administrative
delegate. Congress itself responded to obvious hazards, and made
its own determination of the relative weight to be given the costs
and benefits of the transport of certain hazardous materials on
vessels.
There are a number of possible explanations for why Congress
elected to proceed in this fashion. First, it is unlikely that there
would be extensive debate on the need for limitations and even
prohibitions on the transport of explosives and hazardous materials on vessels, especially on passenger-carrying vessels. Consequently, there would be less reason to avoid potentially divisive
and disruptive legislative debate by delegating the entire problem
to an agency for it to resolve.
Second, the matters before Congress were within its relative
competence. It could legislate on these matters with a high degree
of specificity without sensing the need for continuing administrative expertise and guidance. It is nevertheless noteworthy that
Congress did find it necessary to delve into technical matters when
it addressed the time and temperature for decomposition of certain
explosives and the specific chemical components of others. Yet in
the spectrum of technical complexity these matters are not of the
nature of those concerning, for example, the safety of nuclear
power plants. Here the nature of the cost/benefit issues was such
that there was little need for the accumulated and continuing expertise of an agency to determine whether certain materials should
be carried on vessels. It was clear to Congress that an agency
should not be involved in the determination. Thus, the primary
functions of the agency in this instance were in the areas of inspec233
tion and enforcement.
Finally, it may be that Congress recognized that delegation of
any opportunity for an agency to engage in cost/benefit analysis on
zation Plan did was to make permanent what the President had done by Executive Order
early in World War II. Harry S. Truman, Letter to Congress re Reorg. Plan of 1946, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1673. The permanent assignment
of the responsibility to the Coast Guard recognized that the functions involved were related
to the regular activities and general purposes of the Coast Guard and that it had been successful in discharging these responsibilities during the war.
233. See 46 U.S.C. § 170(7)(a) (1982).
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these issues would carry a higher degree of political risk. In the
setting of a major disaster it might prove difficult to convince the
public that Congress had no choice but to let an agency deal with
the issue. Constituents might be prone to ask why Congress even
gave an agency the chance to err when Congress itself was capable
of addressing the issues and barring the transport of dangerous
materials. The statutory barrier eliminates this political risk.
In this context it would seem that these particular statutory barriers are not particularly harmful. Congress undertook the task of
cost/benefit analysis in an area where it could reasonably be expected to deal intelligently and effectively with the technical issues
and delegated only those tasks which it could not be expected to
perform, namely inspections and enforcement. As noted, it may
even be the preferable route from a political perspective. Thus, the
statutory barrier in this case could be considered useful and
desirable.
One flaw in this assessment is the assumption that Congress
does have the expertise to legislate in definitive fashion on these
matters. Certainly the fact that Congress had to amend the statute
in major respects in 1940 suggests that technological developments
may require statutory revisions. Naturally an agency could provide
continuing supervision without the risk of having attention diverted to other matters. Congress, on the other hand, may not be
able to devote attention to changing a statutory provision on a
"temperature of one hundred and sixty-seven degrees Fahrenheit"
even when present information indicates that it should. Congress
typically will have other matters with which it must deal. This suggests an inevitable and perhaps undesirable effect of a statutory
barrier; science and technology are "frozen" by the terms of the
statute.
IV.

STATUTORY BARRIERS-THE RELATIONSHIP TO BROADER
THEMES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In the preceding two parts of this study the focus has been upon
the varieties of statutory inhibitions to the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis, with the part just concluded considering specific case studies involving statutory barrier and the question of the need for their retention or change. Perhaps the
statutory barrier is simply one more of life's opportunities for selective hostility or enthusiasm. If so, it should be recognized and
accepted as such. Yet either hostility or enthusiasm may be tempered when the immediate object of attention is placed in broader
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perspective.
With this in mind, the objective in the following sections is to
relate the phenomenon of the statutory barrier to broader themes
in administrative law. It is hoped that this analysis will aid in assessing the utility and desirability of statutory barriers to the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis.
A. The Delegation Doctrine-Strainsin Administrative Law
Espousing Revival of the Doctrine and Alternative Means of
Achieving Its Objectives
In the past it has been a common tenet of administrative law
that a legislative body is not entitled to delegate its power to another, including an administrative agency. It is equally well established that in the normal conduct of governmental affairs legislative bodies frequently delegate sweeping authority to administrative agencies, and at least at the federal level, the courts
rarely have struck down such grants of authority on the ground of
impermissible delegation.
Constitutional principles provide the basis for this doctrine.
Under the Constitution all federal legislative authority lies in the
Congress of the United States.2 34 Logic, thus, leads to the conclusion that no others may exercise this power and remain within constitutional bounds, even with the consent of Congress manifested
in an express delegation of that authority. Shortly before the turn
of the century Justice Harlan stated the basic principle in Field v.
Clark: 38 "That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
23 6
Constitution."
The judiciary, however, furnished the pragmatism necessary to
mitigate the implications of this prohibition. Even as the Court reiterated the principle in Field, it found a delegation of authority to
the President in connection with the imposition of tariffs constitutional. The Court observed that "[1]egislative power was exercised
when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect
upon a named contingency. What the president was required to do
was simply in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the mak234.
Congress
235.
236.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the
of the United States."
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 692.
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ing of law. ' 23 7 This result has been typical. Congress spins off some
of its authority to persons in government outside the legislative
branch, the Supreme Court upholds the delegation, and it does so
without directly rejecting the basic prohibition and often offering
it at least lip service. 238 The pragmatism conducive to such results
is revealed in another of the earlier cases in which the Court observed that "[i]f Congress were to be required to fix every rate, it
would be impossible to exercise the power at all. Therefore, common sense requires that in the fixing of such rates, Congress may
provide a Commission . . .to fix those rates .... 1,,31
Indeed, only twice has the United States Supreme Court declared delegations of authority to government officials unconstitutional on the ground of impermissible delegation. In 1935 in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan2 4 it struck down the President's
delegated authority to ban shipments of "hot oil" under the National Industrial Recovery Act. In the same year it took similar
action in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States2 4 1 with respect
to the President's authority under the same act to approve codes
of fair competition. However, after Panama and Schechter the
Court returned to its prior practice of upholding the constitutionality of congressional delegations of authority to federal administrative officials. 242 The result has been the continued vitality of the
abstract constitutional principle prohibiting delegation and the irrelevance of that principle as an effective means of constraining
delegations of legislative authority. This, however, has not been enthusiastically embraced in all quarters as an acceptable or desirable accommodation of constitutional principle and practical reality.
The Supreme Court's traditional inclination to give little practical effect and meaning to the delegation doctrine has not escaped
criticism. Both within and without the Court there have been those
who have advocated that the doctrine be revived.
Various Justices have been troubled from time to time by the
Court's failure to apply the doctrine more rigorously in controlling
237. Id. at 693.
238. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (price controls); J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (tariffs); Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470 (1904) (tea standards).
239. Hampton & Co., 276 U.S. at 407-08.
240. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
241. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
242. See, e.g, Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (renegotiation of war contracts); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (conservators for distressed financial institutions); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (price controls).
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delegations of authority to administrative agencies. For example,
in Arizona v. California43 Justices Douglas and Stewart joined
Justice Harlan in partial dissent. The case concerned the legitimacy of a delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Interior
under the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928. Justice Harlan
wrote that "[tihe unrestrained power to determine the burden of
[water] shortages is the power to make a political decision of the
highest order"2 44 and, thus, "[t]he delegation of such unrestrained
authority to an executive official raises, to say the least, the gravest
2' 45
constitutional doubts.
More recently Justice Rehnquist in particular has been the
Court's principal advocate of resurrection of the delegation doctrine. Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute concerned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's standard limiting occupational exposure to benzene. 24 The
Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals holding the
standard invalid. Justice Rehnquist agreed with this result, but for
different reasons. In a concurring opinion he indicated that Congress, in delegating its authority to the Secretary of Labor, had
failed to give any precise or even discernible indication of whether
the Secretary was to weigh costs and benefits in promulgating
standards. Thus, he concluded "that Congress, the governmental
body best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this case, has improperly delegated that choice to
the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this Court."24 7 He
urged that "[w]e ought not to shy away from our judicial duty to
invalidate unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority"2 48
and "[i]f we are ever to reshoulder the burden of ensuring that
Congress itself make the critical policy decisions, these are surely
243. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272-82 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (Justice Brennan concurred in the decision striking down a portion of the Subversive Activities Control Act, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 937 (1950), but
preferred the delegation doctrine rather than the First Amendment as the basis for the
unconstitutionality of the statute); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (Justice Black dissented from a decision upholding the authority of the Secretary
of State to impose area restrictions on the right to travel. Unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority was the basis for his dissent.).
244. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963).
245. Id.
246. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). See generally SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51-52 (2d ed.
1984), for a discussion of Justice Rehnquist's views on revival of the delegation doctrine.
247. 448 U.S. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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A year later another OSHA standard concerning cotton dust in
the workplace was before the Court. Again Justice Rehnquist was
unsuccessful in convincing a majority of the unconstitutionality of
the delegation of standard setting authority to the Secretary, although the Chief Justice did join him in dissent. He wrote: "Congress simply left the crucial policy choices in the hands of the Secretary of Labor" and "in so doing. . unconstitutionally delegated
0
its legislative responsibility to the Executive Branch.

25

Justice Rehnquist's desire to revive and invoke the doctrine was
founded on his view of the salutary purposes of the doctrine. First,
it assures "that important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the
popular will.

2

51

Next, it makes it more likely that when Congress

finds it necessary to delegate authority, its delegation will be accompanied by standards to guide the delegatee in its exercise. 252
And finally, the presence of accompanying standards will permit
the judiciary to determine whether an253
agency has strayed beyond
the confines of its delegated authority.
Justice Rehnquist's position is not without support form outside
the Court. Others have urged that the delegation doctrine be given
more than its present status as historical curiosity. 25' Judge Skelly

Wright is one prominent example. In reviewing Kenneth Culp Davis' 1969 book, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry,55
Judge Wright questioned the practicality of reliance upon agency
rulemaking as a means of defining and controlling discretionary
administrative action. 6 Such discretion is typically the product of
broad and uncontrolled delegations of authority to administrative
agencies, and one of the means Judge Wright offers for controlling
that discretion is the delegation doctrine:
Yet at the risk of seeming antiquarian, I think the reported demise of the

249. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
250. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 548 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally supra Part III.A for a discussion of other implications of

these cases.
251. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 687 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
255. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). See infra text
accompanying notes 270-75 for a discussion of Professor Davis' alternatives to the delegation doctrine for control of agency discretion.
256. Wright, Beyond DiscretionaryJustice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 580 (1972).
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delegation doctrine is a bit premature. To be sure, we can all join in rejecting broad formulations of the doctrine . . . . But one can reject . . .
extreme position[s] without conceding that Congress should be permitted,
in effect, to vote itself out'of business. There must be some limit on the
extent to which Congress can transfer its own powers to other bodies without guidance as to how these powers should be exercised. " "

Thus, he concludes that "the delegation doctrine retains an important potential as a check on the exercise of unbounded, standardless discretion by administrative agencies"2 "8 and expresses his
hope "that, with a slight nudge from the courts, Congress would
eagerly reassume its rightful role as the author of meaningful organic charters for administrative agencies. '' 9
John Hart Ely is another who finds no comfort in the widespread acceptance of broad delegations of authority. In Democracy
and Distrust, A Theory of JudicialReview he explains this in part
as a matter of political convenience. "[I]t is simply easier, and it
pays more visible political dividends, to play errand-boy-cumombudsman than to play one's part in a genuinely legislative process."2 60 The result is that the administrators perform the tasks of
the legislators, and this Ely concludes "is wrong, not because it
isn't 'the way it was meant to be'-in some circumstances there
may be little objection to institutions' trading jobs-but rather because it is undemocratic, in the quite obvious sense that by refusing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic
republic."" 1 Revival of the delegation doctrine with judicial insistence on meaningful policy guidance from legislators is one means
Ely offers to correct the problem.
James 0. Freedman also sees reason for revival of the delegation
doctrine. Indeed, in some measure he sees evidence of an inclina-

tion on the part of the Supreme Court to do S0.262 If this is to
occur, he urges, however, that the Court "must go beyond merely
reiterating the doctrine's traditional teaching that Congress must
state meaningful statutory standards for the exercise of delegated
legislative power. "263 In his judgment more is required: "The new
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIW 131 (1980).
Id. at 132.

J. FREEDMAN,

CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT 80-88, 93 (1978).

263.

Id. at 93.
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lines of the doctrine ought to be drawn to reflect the normative
premise that Congress, in the act of delegating legislative power,
may not abdicate its constitutional responsibility for making the
2'6 4
nation's basic decisions of policy.
These calls to revive the delegation doctrine" 5 need not be
viewed merely as nostalgia for a past which was rejected with
clearly compelling good reason. Rather they would place a higher
value and greater faith in democratic processes in lieu of exercises
of expert discretion in relative political insulation. As Judge
Wright observed: "An argument for letting the experts decide
when the people's representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is
an argument for paternalism and against democracy. "266
That the idea of reviving the delegation doctrine appears to be
gaining adherents within and without the judiciary does not alter
the reality that broad delegations remain entrenched and generally
accepted and even valued.2 67 As recently noted by three advocates
of revival:
[T]he occasional plea for resuscitation of the nondelegation doctrine has not
prompted a response from the Supreme Court or the lower courts. Still, the
idea of a change in constitutional rules governing legislative delegations has
acquired a fresh dignity. It should inspire a serious dialogue if not imminent
action.268

One reason for this seems to be the view that there are effective
and desirable alternative means of achieving the objectives of the
doctrine.6 9
264.
265.

Id.
See also T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 129-46, 197-99 (1969); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63-67 (1982); Koslow, Standardless Administrative
Adjudication, 22 AD. L. REV. 407 (1970); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1127-30 (1977); Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for
the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. REV. 469 (1968).
266. Wright, supra note 256, at 585.
267. The judicial record amply demonstrates that the dominant position is supportive
of broad delegation of power to administrative agencies. There is considerable support and
even enthusiasm for the status quo. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971); Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1693-97 (1975).
268. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 265, at 67 (emphasis in original).
269. Whether revival of the doctrine would produce the anticipated result of more
refined legislation and less administrative discretion is a distinct and important practical
question. See Bunn, Irwin & Sido, No Regulation Without Representation: Would Judicial
Enforcement of a Stricter Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Administrative Lawmaking?, 1983
Wis. L. REV. 341. This study sought to assess whether stricter adherence to the nondelegation doctrine influences the nature of legislation. Judicial decisions and statutes in Wiscon-
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Perhaps the leading proponent of alternatives to the delegation
doctrine has been Kenneth Culp Davis. His views on the subject
are developed principally in his book, Discretionary Justice: A
Preliminary Inquiry,7 0 and in an article, A New Approach to
71
Delegation.
Davis would not resurrect the doctrine in its traditional form:
"The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. It has
not prevented the delegation of legislative power. Nor has it accomplished its later purpose of assuring that delegated power will
be guided by meaningful standards. ' 272 His preference would be
modification of the doctrine with an accompanying shift in its emphasis. The concern would not be to force legislative development
of standards; nor would the objective be to inhibit delegations of
authority. 7 3 Rather one would look to the agencies themselves for
clarification of the standards to guide exercises of broad delegations of authority, 27 4 and the courts would stress administrative
safeguards and standards to protect "against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power . ... 2'l
This suggested modification and expansion of the purposes of
the doctrine clearly separate Davis from those who advocate its revival. Under the Davis approach the resolution of policy choices
would not be more democratic. The basic decisions still would not
be made by elected decisionmakers, although they would be made
and with much greater clarity and specificity than at present. Yet
this approach would not satisfy the concerns of the proponents
that the decisions should be made by what they see as the constitutionally appropriate institution of government, the Congress.
Others have given less emphasis to the administrative development of standards to confine and structure delegated discretion
and more to insistence on adequate administrative procedures to
sin and Illinois were the focal point of the study; these two states represent the poles of
judicial application of the doctrine. The authors concluded that "a strict nondelegation doctrine does not appear to prevail over the other differences between legislatures that affect
the breadth of delegated discretion" and, consequently, "it is doubtful that the doctrine's
revival by state or federal courts would be worth the resulting added uncertainty of statutory validity." Id. at 378. Under these circumstances alternative means of achieving the
objectives of the doctrine would appear to have the advantage of practicality as well as
whatever substantive merit that they carry.
270. DAvIs, supra note 255, at 27-51.

271. Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
DAvIs, supra note 255, at 50.
Id.
Davis, supra note 271, at 75.

CHI.

L. REV. 713 (1969).
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protect against arbitrary and capricious action."" These individuals also accept Professor Davis' proposition that broad and even
standardless delegations are the likely norm, and they move from
this perception of the realities to focus on procedural safeguards as
an alternative to revival. They, too, are subject to the criticism
that the appropriate governmental institution still would not be
making the fundamental policy choices.
Professor Richard B. Stewart offers yet another alternate to revival of the doctrine. He considers that the latter course would
"clearly be unwise" because "[d]etailed legislative specification of
policies under contemporary conditions would be neither feasible
nor desirable in many cases, and the judges are ill-equipped to distinguish contrary cases." ' For similar reasons he questions the
Davis solution. 17 He does propose one possible alternative which
he characterizes as the "interest representation" model. Under this
approach one accepts that the administrative process should mirror the political process and then focuses on means by which affected interests would be afforded opportunities to participate in
the process. 9
The "interest representation" model, however, is not presented
as a solution to the matter of delegation and its attendant
problems; rather it provides an alternative way of thinking about
the problem without any assurance of "simplistic remedies. ' 28 0 In
this respect the model does present an alternative to the delegation
doctrine, but it is one which is of less determinate and arguably
more realistic nature. Furthermore, it, too, would not satisfy the
desire that Congress alone make the basic policy choices.
B.

Statutory Barriers-Specificityof CongressionalDelegation
as an Alternative to the Delegation Doctrine

The preceding discussion of the delegation doctrine, calls for its
revival, and proposals for alternative means for achieving its objectives provide a framework for assessment of the utility and desirability of statutory barriers to the application of principles of cost/
benefit analysis.
276. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 246, at 59-60. This trend also derives in substantial
measure from Professor Davis, although the courts adopting the approach place primary
emphasis on assuring adequate procedures.
277. Stewart, supra note 267, at 1695.
278. Id. at 1698-1702.
279. Id. at 1711-70.
280. Id. at 1789-90, 1813.
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The principal characteristic of the statutory barrier is its specificity. In the case of a true statutory barrier this specificity is complemented by a clear expression of legislative intent that cost/benefit analysis be precluded. In the case of a partial barrier it is
specificity alone which confines, in some measure, the range of
cost/benefit analysis. In the former,administrative discretion is
confined to the point that it does not really exist. Indeed, the only
latitude for administrative discretion with respect to a true statutory barrier is in the area of prosecutorial discretion and selective
enforcement; a statutory barrier may prescribe what an agency
must do if it acts, but the barrier alone will not compel action if an
agency declines to act at all. Yet for present purposes and within
the terms of a barrier itself, the hallmark is the absence of administrative discretion. Naturally there is a greater range for discretion
and thus cost/benefit analysis in the case of a merely partial
barrier.
For those, and particularly those in the judiciary, who developed
the modern version of the delegation doctrine the statutory barrier
can only mitigate any discomfort they may have in sustaining
broad and undefined delegations of authority to administrative
agencies. By its nature the statutory barrier eliminates the necessity for the doctrine and the tension which otherwise exists with
the traditional prohibition of delegation. The specificity of the barrier in this sense substitutes for the doctrine. On the other hand,
the barrier does represent an exception to the underlying assumption that broad delegations are necessary to modern government
and therefore must be accommodated.
Similarly, those who advocate revival of the doctrine will have
no difficulty with the statutory barrier which precludes cost/benefit
analysis, in whole or in part. The barrier represents greater congressional precision in its delegation of authority to an agency, and
the barrier accomplishes precisely what these persons seek through
revival-democratic resolution of basic policy issues by elected
representatives in Congress. In such cases there is the added virtue
of voluntary congressional action without need for judicial prodding in the form of a resurrected delegation doctrine.
If the advocates of revival are dissatisfied with a particular statutory barrier, it is not likely to be the barrier itself which causes
concern. Rather, the concern is the likely product of disagreement
with the way in which the barrier was designed by Congress and in
which the issues of costs versus benefits were resolved. For these
persons in these instances the implication is that the statutory bar-
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rier need not be eliminated, but merely that it be redesigned by
Congress to strike a new balance between costs and benefits. The
alternative would be to eliminate the barrier and transfer the discretion for cost/benefit analysis to an administrative body, and this
would be unacceptable to the advocates of revival.
Statutory barriers to costbenefit analysis are much less clearly a
satisfactory alternative for those who espouse alternatives to the
doctrine. These persons seems more inclined to accept the inevitability and even desirability of broad delegations, including the
power to weigh costs and benefits in the balance. Consequently
they stress the need for control of discretion once granted.
Thus, a statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis avoids the
problem which the delegation doctrine was developed to address;
there is no broad delegation to be explained or justified. Similarly,
a statutory barrier eliminates the need to revive classic principles
precluding delegation; thus, there is no cause to explore alternatives to the doctrine or its revival.
C.

Statutory Barriers and Administrative Discretion

The discussion in the preceding section provides a framework
which should aid in assessing one's attitude toward statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis. If a degree of logical consistency is a
worthy objective, one should make certain to measure his position
on the question of delegation against that on statutory barriers.
There is an intellectual dilemma in opposing statutory barriers to
cost/benefit analysis and supporting resurrection of the delegation
doctrine in one form or another. As an alternative one can simply
accept that the desirability of statutory barriers versus breadth of
administrative discretion will fluctuate depending on the acceptability of the individuals who have the opportunity to design the
barriers or exercise administrative discretion. Under this approach
one favors statutory barriers if one has working control of Congress; one opposes them if one has working control of the agencies.
If one controls both, the matter becomes academic, and if one controls neither it becomes traumatic.
The choice is, nonetheless, between a logically consistent resolution of the inherent tension between statutory barriers and administrative discretion, or a pragmatic recognition that "it all depends." The purpose of this study is not to recommend one course
or the other, but only to suggest that there is merit in recognizing
the implications of the choice eventually made.
Some further development of this point may be helpful. It ap-
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pears that some of the current interest in statutory barriers to
cost/benefit analysis is attributable to the suspicion that there are
large numbers of these creatures abroad and that they tend to
frustrate enlightened administrative decision making and impede
progress. As this study concludes, the suspicion concerning their
numbers is not justified by the facts. Indeed, it may be that the
suspicion of the number of barriers may be based on agency assertions that an agency would be delighted to engage in cost/benefit
analysis if it were not barred from doing so -by statute. A more
probable explanation of such assertions is agency intransigence, an
unwillingness to engage in cost/benefit analysis. Another consideration which may contribute to the suspicion is the high visibility of
statutory barriers such as the Delaney Clause. That visibility may
suggest to some that the phenomenon is epidemic, although the
reality is that expansive administrative discretion is the norm.
It is at this juncture that devotees of cost/benefit analysis should
proceed with some caution and pause to reflect if they are inclined
to avoid logical inconsistency. As noted, it is difficult to oppose
statutory barriers, embrace cost/benefit analysis at the agency level
and espouse revival of the delegation doctrine at the same time. Of
course, many persons would not attempt to subscribe to each of
these three possibilities, but the author will venture his own suspicion that many persons presently concerned with the existence of
statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis might be equally uncomfortable with broad delegations of authority to administrative
agencies. For such persons, if in fact they exist, the following analysis may be useful even if not consoling.
In those instances where a statute does inhibit cost/benefit analysis, it does not necessarily follow that cost/benefit analysis has
been ignored. Rather, the statute itself will reflect resolution by
Congress of the tension between costs and benefits in the course of
enacting the statute. In this respect a barrier is not necessarily undesirable. As we have seen in a variety of settings, to the extent
that the statute precludes cost/benefit analysis, it withholds discretion from an agency. The effect is greater congressional precision
in the scope of its delegation of authority to the agency.
If one advocates precision in congressional delegation on the
ground that elected institutions of government rather than
unelected administrative bodies should make fundamental policy
decisions, there is reason to be pleased with the statutory barrier.
For such persons the dilemma, if any, is not the existence of the
barrier, but rather the manner in which it was designed by Con-
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gress and the way in which Congress resolved issues of costs versus
benefits. Under these circumstances the statutory barrier need not
be removed, but simply redesigned with a new balance struck between costs and benefits. The alternative is to eliminate the barrier
and transfer the discretion for cost/benefit analysis to an administrative body. If one accepts the latter alternative, it must be recognized and accepted that this requires recognition and acceptance
of broad grants of discretion to administrative officials who sometimes are lambasted as nameless and faceless and even headless. If
this is not a palatable course, the matter comes full circle and the
alternative is congressional resolution of the fundamental and
competing policy interests. This is precisely what a statutory barrier to cost/benefit analysis represents.
V.

Conclusion

A primary objective of the case studies"8 ' was to determine what,
if any, general conclusions might be reached concerning the utility
and desirability of statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis. The
ultimate objective of this study was to determine whether statutory barriers to the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis are useful and desirable.
Implicit in this statement of ultimate objective is the suggestion
that they are not. Barriers inhibit and impede; principles are to be
valued especially when they afford an opportunity to weigh pros
and cons. The absence of a statutory barrier, thus, affords freedom
from arbitrariness and freedom for reasoned decision making. In
this light the statutory barrier deserves abolition; it is neither useful nor desirable. The reality of statutory barriers, however, does
not support this breadth of generalization. Others might discern
patterns or common themes which escape the author, but the case
studies suggest that generalization is difficult if not impossible in
either support or opposition to the statutory barrier.
Actually there may be little need to generalize concerning statutory barriers. First, it should be recalled that true statutory barriers, those where Congress clearly manifests an intention to bar
cost/benefit analysis, are not widespread at the federal level. If
they were, perhaps one would be compelled to address their utility
and desirability in general terms. Their number alone would then
be a factor requiring consideration. Yet since the true statutory
barrier, as opposed to the partial barrier, is rather rare and the
281.
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impact of sheer numbers is not pertinent, evaluation of their merits on an individual basis is not only feasible, but also preferable.
Whatever the perils of generalization, there is less need to face
them in this instance.2 82
An examination of specific statutory barriers gives further reason
to assess their desirability on an individual basis. One reason for
this is the diversity of substantive areas in which the statutory barrier has been employed, notwithstanding their relative scarcity.
The nature of a statutory barrier makes this even more pronounced. The specificity of the statutory barrier tends to make
each unique and intimately tied to the substantive issues at hand.
It is quite different in situations involving broad delegations of authority which, for example, charge agencies with the task of regulating "in the public interest, convenience and necessity."
Notwithstanding these substantial caveats, some modest generalizations do seem justified. They do not, however, support unqualified acceptance or rejection of statutory barriers.
This study began with a search for an acceptable definition of
cost/benefit analysis; it ends with the even more illusive search for
a definition of what constitutes a statutory barrier. The test employed was whether the cost/benefit analysis mandate of Executive
Order 12291 would be precluded by virtue of statutory prescription.
As indicated in the case studies, there are few true or absolute
statutory barriers to cost/benefit analysis. Most are only partial in
nature in that they withdraw from consideration some, but not all
alternative policy choices which are potential objects for analysis.
And it seems that the best evidence of an absolute barrier is a
strong indication that Congress itself has undertaken the task of
weighing costs and benefits, done so in comprehensive fashion and
made clear on the face of the statute or otherwise that its administrative delegate is not to restrike the balance.
The result is a spectrum ranging from total to partial to no barrier at all. Where a particular statute falls on this spectrum is a
function of legislative intent and the specificity of the statute.
Specificity in this context means the extent to which the statute
precludes consideration of alternatives which the analyst otherwise
would consider.
282. Broad delegations of authority and discretion to administrative agencies, in contrast, provide an example of a statutory phenomenon which is susceptible to and even requires generalization. The frequency with which Congress grants such authority in itself
demands an assessment of its desirability and utility.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:489

If one assumes, as many do, that cost/benefit analysis is a useful
and effective adjunct to effective decision making, the true statutory barrier has a probable and important advantage over the partial barrier. In the case of a total barrier it is likely that conscious
cost/benefit analysis of a sort has been employed by Congress.
When Congress expressly prohibits the process at the administrative level it presumably has conducted its own weighing of costs
and benefits. Certainly that is what it did in the case of the Delaney Clause.
The case studies suggest, however, that the rigor of congressional
cost/benefit analysis would not always measure up to the rigor required under Executive Order 12291. This suggests further that
when Congress does impose a barrier to agency cost/benefit analysis and also feels that it is germane and useful to analyzing the
matter under consideration, it should voluntarily impose on itself a
rigorous brand of cost/benefit analysis in designing the statute.
The partial barrier is another matter. To the extent it eliminates
alternatives from consideration under cost/benefit analysis it is improbable that Congress itself has engaged in such analysis in eliminating the alternative. Even if it has, it is unlikely it will have been
rigorous. Partial barriers seldom seem to be the product of intentional cost/benefit analysis. What Congress might do is pay greater
attention to the partial barrier and, if inclined, insure that cost/
benefit analysis is conducted at its level when it precludes such
analysis of one or more but not all alternative policy choices at the
agency level.
If one accepts, as suggested, that the merits of individual statutory barriers depend primarily on the specifics of the factual environment in which they arise and are applied, further analysis may
be helpful in determining their desirability. If the issues are relatively simple and within the competence of Congress, the barrier
may be desirable and certainly not harmful. However, its overall
desirability must depend on some other factor. Rarely will a matter be within the competence of Congress and beyond the competence of an agency created by Congress.
If the issues are complex, technical and in a constant state of
change, the need for agency expertise and continuing supervision
suggests that a statutory barrier is undesirable. If a matter is realistically beyond the competence of Congress, any barrier created
by it can only prove counterproductive. For example, if a matter
can be addressed only with an appreciation of complex scientific
and technical issues, an expert agency may be the only effective
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institution for weighing costs versus benefits. This problem is aggravated if the area is one in which scientific knowledge and technology are changing at a rapid pace. In such cases a statutory barrier created by Congress at best may reflect an adequate
assessment at the time of enactment, but it may become outdated
and an unreasonable burden not long thereafter.
The politics of statutory barriers offers similarly mixed conclusions. If there is substantial concern that agencies will be subject
to external pressure which they will not be able to withstand, the
statutory barrier will protect the agency from itself. It also may
assure that the balance struck between costs and benefits in the
mind of Congress is not undermined by a reluctant agency, and
this may spare Congress the ire of constituents who support the
decision reflected in the barrier. Yet statutory barriers are visible
in ways in which agency exercises of discretion may not be; thus,
agencies sometimes may be better able to resist or disperse external pressures than Congress. In the latter case a statutory barrier
would be less desirable than a barrier created by an agency. And in
another case that same visibility of the statutory barrier may be
politically useful because Congress will be in a better position to
take credit for a danger thwarted or benefit conferred.
Furthermore and beyond political considerations, statutory barriers are useful as a means of controlling administrative action. Yet
they are undesirable if administrative discretion is required to deal
with a matter effectively and intelligently.
It is apparent that even these most modest generalizations concerning the desirability and utility of statutory barriers to the application of principles of cost/benefit analysis "tend themselves to
prove the initial point-that the question is best answered in the
context of individual barriers. This list of variations on the pros
and cons of statutory barriers could go on, but for present purposes it should be sufficient to illustrate the point that whether or
not they are useful and desirable depends on the circumstances.
There does, however, appear to be one basis for generalizing
about statutory barriers which is a function of matters independent of the specifics of any individual barrier. If one has a working
majority in Congress and no effective control over administrative
agencies, statutory barriers may be perceived as worthwhile. If one
is on the other side in this distribution of power, then one's assessment of statutory barriers will vary accordingly. And if one has
working control in both Congress and the agencies, there would be
less reason to care.
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The obvious advantage of this approach in evaluating the merits
of statutory barriers is that it produces a consistent and comprehensive position on the subject. The disadvantages are equally obvious. It draws upon a simplistic view of political control in Congress and in the agencies, and even if one accepts its basic
premises, the fluidity of political relationships and power guarantees that before long it will be necessary to change one's position
on statutory barriers. Thus, as the case studies indicate, the merits
of statutory barriers can best be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

